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The objective of this study is to analyse the exchange of market information in an 
organizational setting between a retailer and a supplier. This is influenced primarily by the 
industry structure and environment as well as relationship traits of the firms and the internal 
strategy of companies. This study aims to identify the key influencing factors and analyse their 
effect on the sharing of market information.  
 
Research methods 
Empirically the study is positioned in the Finnish retail trade sector that is characterized by 
high retailer market concentration. The research takes on a qualitative industry-level approach 
to interview a total of fifteen people representing suppliers, retailers, trade associations and 
regulatory authorities. The frames for the research arise from the recent termination of 
ScanTrack –based sharing of consumer sales information.  
 
Summary of Findings 
The research identified fourteen key factors related to industry setting, competition regulation, 
company relationships and retailer strategies that have an effect on market information 
exchange. In analysis of these factors regarding the ScanTrack case, it was found that the 
complete termination of the system in Finland was more of a retailer-based decision than an 
outcome of competition regulation.   
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1 INTRODUCTION 
For many companies, having market information is beyond a mere preference or a nice-to-have 
asset. Market information is vital for them on many levels and it may even create a competitive 
advantage. Therefore, it is surely something that companies notice if they no longer have 
access to it. Nonetheless, the market economy does not always follow pre-defined principles 
and for various reasons the flow of information between companies may be disrupted or 
altered. This study observes a situation, where a major source of market information is 
terminated and firms face a market with totally new reasoning. Ultimately, what are the factors 
that affect the exchange of market information between companies? This study aims to shed 
light into this prominent question.  
 
1.1 THEORETICAL POSITIONING OF THE STUDY 
This study relies on a pluralistic theory base consisting of the following theoretical 
fundaments: 
(a) Political Economy Framework  
(b) Institutional Theory 
(c) Exchange Theory 
(d) Competition Regulation 
 
This study turns to the political economy theory base and institutional theory to examine 
industry settings and networks. Similarly, findings of the exchange theory scholars enlighten 
the key issues in the interaction and information exchange that occur between these parties. 
Special market situations and regulations impact these relationships and exchanges and 
therefore the analysis of competition regulation and other restricting impacts have been 
included in this study. Next, these four theoretical backgrounds are discussed more elaborately.  
 
A significant amount of research has been conducted on marketing channels founding on the 
political economy framework from the early 1970‟s and 1980‟s (Benson 1975, Stern & Reve 
1980, Achrol et al. 1983). The political economy approach “...views a social system as 
comprising interacting sets of major economic and socio-political forces which affect 
collective behaviour and performance” (Stern & Reve 1980, 53). The political economy 
approach is used to analyse relations and influencers of an industry. Scholars have analysed the 
effects of the macro environment on micro dyadic channel structures and processes. The 
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special focus has been on economic and socio-political external factors and their influence on 
channel relationships. In early research papers, research channels are analysed predominantly 
through what later became known as an „efficiency-based task environment perspective‟ 
(Grewal & Dharwadkar 2002; see also Frazier 1999). Instead of drawing attention only to the 
technologies employed within the channel or taking an economic vs. behavioural approach, the 
research of Stern and Reve (1980) now encompassed the influence of the external environment. 
They identified the main channel dimensions and studied how these different dimensions were 
interconnected, hence how the structure and behaviour in a distribution channel was shaped by 
the external environment.  
 
In relation to the political economy approach, this study is also linked to the institutional 
theory. Grewal and Dharwadkar (2002) introduced the „legitimacy-based institutional 
environment approach‟ and focus was placed on the institutional environment and how for 
instance regulations may require channel members to alter their behaviour so as to achieve 
legitimacy. Key influencers to institutional theory have been DiMaggio and Powell (1983), 
who discuss the concept of isomorphism (see also Scott 1995a). The institutional theory shows 
that firm actions are influenced by very subtle cues as well as an interest for unified behaviour 
with their environment.  
 
The third foundation for this study is the exchange theory. The political economy framework 
and the exchange theory are justifiably interrelated: For instance Ross & Robertson (2007) 
analyse compound relationships basing their study on both theories. Exchange theory analyses 
resource transfers within exchange relationships (Frazier et al. 2009; see also Thibaut & Kelly 
1959; Homans 1961). The theory dates back to as early as the 50‟s and 60‟s, where exchange 
relations of social groups were examined. Since then the scholarly discussion has broadened to 
examining business relationships and the interactions that occur between organisational actors. 
The exchange theory is used to evaluate information exchange between stakeholders in an 
industry. Among other things, it discusses the complexity of relationships as well as the power 
balances between companies.  
 
The fourth theory is competition regulation. This is viewed through theorist and specialist 
analysis related to concentrated markets and antitrust regulation. For instance Kühn (2001) and 
Overgaard & Møllgaard (2005) approach regulatory restrictions on information exchange from 
a theoretical standpoint. In addition, this study introduces the key elements of EU‟s antitrust 
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regulation and discusses whether it fits to scholarly views on how market economies should be 
regulated and allowed to function.  
 
1.2 EMPIRICAL POSITIONING OF THE STUDY 
Between early 2007 and June 2008 the Finnish Competition Authority (FCA) investigated the 
information exchange in the Finnish grocery retailing sector, which has an over €12 billion 
market size (FCA Yearbook 2008, 17). The three main players Ruokakesko Oy (Kesko), 
Suomen Osuuskauppojen Keskuskunta (SOK) and Suomen Lähikauppa Oy
1
 (former Tradeka 
Oy) had exchanged up-to-date sales information collected by the ScanTrack system which was 
operated through AC Nielsen, a global information and media company. Due to the highly 
oligopolistic nature of the Finnish retail sector, the FCA was concerned that the exchange of 
precise and fresh sales information may have consequences that hinder competition. The three 
biggest retailers accouned for 85% of the market with the two most notable companies clearly 
being SOK and Kesko
2
. In June 2008 the FCA concluded that the procedure could have been 
harmful for competition in the industry and it may have had price increase implications.  
 
However no further actions were taken since SOK and Kesko were initially the ones who had 
informed FCA about the system and secondly since they had already shut down its operation 
by deciding to withhold their cash register information. What may seem like an easy closure of 
the matter nevertheless affected also other companies in the industry. For instance suppliers 
had been relying on the ScanTrack information from AC Nielsen in their operations. The 
preciseness of the information had been crucial for the suppliers as they identified the demand 
and sales growth of specific product categories. A concern that rose from the supplier side was 
whether the lack of information may in the future in fact hinder competition or be a drawback 
even for R&D and product development. Also, information brings power and some industry 
practitioners argue that the mantle has now shifted in favor of the retailers since they have 
exclusivity to sales statistics that can be used for instance in procurement activities for instance 
when conducting business with the suppliers. Some of these concerns may be overstated, yet 
what is clear is that information exchange in the industry has altered. This study aims to 
                                                 
1
 Suomen Lähikauppa Oy is the firm‟s official name in both Finnish and English. Therefore it will be used 
throughout this study. As a direct translation it means „Finland‟s Local Store‟. (http://www.lahikauppa.fi/en/) 
2
 The market shares on the Finnish daily consumer goods retail trade sector were the following in 2006: S-Group 
(SOK) 39,9%, K-Group (Kesko) 33,5%, Tradeka 11,9%, Lidl 4,1,%, others 10,6% (Finnish Competition 
Authorities 2008, 154/61/2007, 2) 
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analyze the focus and reactions of the stakeholders as well as their mutual interaction with 
regards to market information exchange. 
 
1.3 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
To arrive to discussing the research problem, it is important to first highlight the relevant 
research gap upon which the content of this research have been set upon. This paper focuses on 
the sharing of market information in the retail sector, especially between retailers and 
suppliers. According to Frazier et al. (2009, 31), the sharing of strategic information from 
distributors to their suppliers remains an under researched subject and thus it deserves more 
attention. Especially in cases when market information is not shared through third parties, the 
critical issue becomes the relationship between the retailer and supplier. The empirical part of 
this study shows a situation where information exchange is limited by both regulatory and 
commercial factors. It can be argued that high market concentration is an element for these 
limitations of the given market and its impact on the outcome is an interesting issue. Frazier 
(2009, 42) notes that research is needed to establish the effect of market concentration on the 
sharing of strategic information. This study is placed in the midst of these recently pointed out 
very interesting research topics. 
 
The research problem of this study is the following:  
Exchange of market information in an organizational setting between retailers and suppliers 
and the factors that influence it.  
 
This problem has been divided into two research questions:  
1. How does industry structure and environment affect information exchange? 
2. How do intra-organizational factors and relationship traits affect the nature and content 
of information exchange? 
 
1.4 KEY DEFINITIONS 
The concepts and terminology that are central for the understanding of this study are linked to 
the notion of information. The following will discuss information from different perspectives 
and frame the issues relevant for this study. Further terminology and frameworks are brought 
up gradually throughout the paper. 
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Data, information and knowledge 
Information is often confused with knowledge and data. These are all broad terms and are in 
fact linked to each other. The simplest way to view their relationships is to think of it as a 
continuum like presented in figure 1 below. Data is the lowest level in the hierarchy and once it 
is being processed, it evolves into information and eventually knowledge (Ackoff 1989).    
 
Figure 1. The Relationship between Data, Information and Knowledge 
 
Furthermore, the focus of this study is not on information itself, but the exchange of it. Both 
the theoretical and empirical parts of this research likewise put emphasis on the exchange of 
market and sales information. Hence our concentration is constantly on the factors that 
influence information exchange: the environment including regulation, relationships between 
companies and company-specific factors.  
  
ScanTrack information exchange 
In analysing the exchange of market information, this study takes ScanTrack –based exchange 
as the starting point in the empirical section. ScanTrack is service provided by AC Nielsen in 
several countries. However in Finland some aspects of it were in conflict with antitrust 
regulation, which eventually led to the abandoning of the entire system. Like in other countries, 
the ScanTrack in Finland was an information exchange system based on historical consumer 
sales information. Bar code data was collected from cash registers in retail stores. This data is 
then assembled and processed. Retailers and suppliers as well as other industry players all 
benefit from the data. Many firms establish contracts to receive the information even at 
frequent one-week intervals. However, the fact that information is a very broad term applies 
also in the Finnish consumer goods retail sector. The division is not clear-cut between 
ScanTrack –information (or information that has replaced it) and other information shared by 
the stakeholders. Especially in the current situation a lot of information is exchanged in face-
to-face meetings, which increases flexibility in what is exchanged. In the scope of this study, 
ScanTrack works as a basis for the empirical discussions. Information sharing is restricted to 
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what is linked to ScanTrack as well as exchange that resulted after the termination of the 
system.  
 
Intelligence and strategic information 
Information is also sometimes referred to as intelligence (see for instance Frazier 1999). It is 
often associated to market intelligence, which is knowledge and information available on the 
market (Maltz and Kohli 1996). According to the authors, market intelligence can be obtained 
through formal and informal mechanisms. They also introduce the concept of „intelligence 
dissemination‟ within a firm; however our interest for now is only on the procurement of 
market intelligence.  
 
Lastly, strategic information is a key term for this study. It is essentially related to perceptions 
and prioritizations of companies. Information that is central in applying the firm strategy is 
referred to as strategic information (Frazier et al. 2009). Therefore, strategic information may 
come from very different sources. We will later distinguish between internal and external 
strategic information of companies and how this is exchanged.  
 
1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE PAPER  
This study has been structured into six main chapters. In this first chapter we have gone 
through the theoretical and empirical background of the study, the research gap and problem as 
well as the key concepts and terminology definitions. Attention will now be drawn to the 
scholarly research on the issue as the second chapter takes a pluralistic theory approach and 
elaborates on the various viewpoints to information exchange in different environments and 
relationships. As a result of this analysis a framework is constructed in part 2.4 incorporating 
the different factors affecting information exchange.   
 
Chapter three describes the methodology of the empirical part of the study including the 
qualitative study approach and the stakeholders of the study. Hence, chapter four goes into the 
empirical part of the study, which is based on the stakeholder interviews. The theoretical 
discussion is mirrored to practice and further analysed in this chapter. To sum it up a refined 
framework is presented in part 4.5. In the fifth chapter the outcomes of the theoretical and 
empirical sections are given a critical analysis and the results are opened up through 
discussion. The managerial and empirical relevance and implications of the study are 
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highlighted as an important part of this chapter. Directions for further research and limitations 
of the study are also discussed. To end with, a brief summary of the study and its results is 
presented in chapter six.  
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2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The theoretical discussion concerning information exchange has been divided into two 
different areas: information exchange environment (2.1) and information exchange 
relationships (2.2). Based on this analysis a framework is developed at the end of the chapter 
to pull together the different factors affecting information exchange.  
 
2.1 INFORMATION EXCHANGE ENVIRONMENT 
In the early 1980‟s Stern and Reve (1980) begun mapping the distribution channel with an aim 
to identify and dimensionalize the key variables influencing and ordering channel structure and 
behaviour. Before their work a major part of distribution channel research had been focused on 
the technologies employed by the channel members as well as on economic viewpoints 
regarding channel efficiency. Some research had also been conducted regarding behavioural 
aspects resulting in socially oriented studies on power and conflict phenomena. Primarily, the 
prior research had focused on dyadic relationships excluding the analysis of a more complex 
network with for instance institutional influences.  
 
In their research, Stern and Reve (1980) identified the channel dimensions as fields. By doing 
this, they attempted to classify channel interaction in a larger context to build the basis for 
future research. They emphasized multilateral interactions (see also Mouzas et al. 2008) where 
the interactions within the complex socioeconomic setting were more than merely cause-effect 
mechanisms, such as the effect of channel design on costs. This section includes analysis of 
strategic industry positioning as well as the channel environment and actors. Moreover, the 
regulatory context is taken into consideration and included in the evaluation of the information 
exchange environment.  
 
2.1.1 Industry Structure and Networks 
The network of a company is crucial to its financial performance and profitability (Gulati et al. 
2000, Piskorski 1999, Cool & Schendel 1988). Information sharing is carried out through the 
company‟s network when it does not occur through a centralized system. In situations when a 
centralized system is not in operation (as discussed in the empirical part of this study), the 
significance of the relationships increase. Attaining relevant market information is often of 
strategic importance for companies. It is vital that firms consider their strategic ties also from 
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this perspective, since information networks can be critical to a firm‟s performance. Moreover, 
when analysing an industry from the outside, it is interesting to look at the strategic networks 
since these have an imminent effect on the information exchange (Kale et al. 2000, Zaheer & 
Zaheer 1997). Unfortunately they are not always easily identifiable. Additionally, companies 
often share detailed market information only with those organizations that are of strategic 
importance to them. Hsu et al. (2008) indicate a positive correlation between information 
sharing capabilities and buyer-supplier relationships and performance.  
 
Recent views (Gulati et al. 2000) have brought up the notion of strategic networks and propose 
the studying of them to allow a more refined understanding of an industry structure. The 
authors identify the following elements as having an impact on profitability in the industry: 
industry structure, positioning within an industry and inimitable firm resources and 
capabilities. Next, these and a few additional aspects are analysed more closely.   
 
Firstly, strategic networks can influence competition and profitability in the industry through 
three different types of relational characteristics interlinked with industry structure: network 
structure, network membership and tie modality (Galaskiewicz & Zaheer 1999). Network 
structure is the overall pattern of relationships embedded within the industry, for instance how 
dense the interfirm ties are. Likewise the composition of the network, such as identities, 
resources and access of the members, are analysed through network membership. Here it is not 
only relevant how the resources flow within the industry; instead the industry is viewed in a 
broader network of resource flows. The relations towards supplier and buyer industries may 
also affect the membership in the network. As an example, favourable ties to either upstream or 
downstream industries can increase profitability and create entry barriers to the industry.  
 
In taking a strategic network perspective to sources of differential returns, the second aspect is 
the positioning within an industry. This has also been referred to as the intra-industry structure 
and it proposes identification of strategic groups in the industry. The firms can be grouped 
based on similarities and attributes. Similarities could be detected for instance in scale, product 
and service prices, features and quality, technology, or customer base (Gulati et al. 2000).  The 
reason why the industry structure and strategic groups can affect the profitability of firms is 
that they act as enablers and impediments of business transactions. The boundaries are hard to 
traverse due to mobility barriers (Caves & Porter 1977) and belonging to a group or being left 
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outside of the bloc has straight-forward implications on the firms‟ performance and even 
profitability (Cool & Schendel 1988).  
 
Going a step further, the network perspective allows for a different kind of intra-industry 
grouping. Strategic cliques or blocs can be identified by firm interactions and relationships 
(Nohria & Garcia 1991). This is a very practical view since it is in fact the interaction between 
the firms that binds them together. Interaction-based grouping also draws focus to the exchange 
relationship, including information exchange. Logically belonging to the same clique should 
give a relationship advantage in contrast to those firms that operate outside of it. Firms outside 
the bloc do not have the same intensity of interaction with firms within the clique as those 
belonging to it. Evidence provided by Piskorski (1999) indicates that not being inside a 
strategic bloc can result in significant profit differentials which are attributable to the clique. 
Škapa and Kubátová (2009) also underline that the economic performance of a firm is highly 
dependent on its relationships and ability to create value through these. On the long run, 
managing the firm’s network becomes very important, especially when there is also a need to 
develop interfirm knowledge sharing routines (Kale et al. 2000). Noteworthy is that any of 
these network structures or ties can also lock the firm into undesirable strategic relations and 
thus have a negative effect on the firm.  
 
The third aspect for analysis is the possession of inimitable resources and capabilities. 
Resource-based theory highlights that an enduring competitive advantage can be gained when 
the firm controls or owns unique and non-substitutable resources (Peteraf 1993). Typically 
these have been sought for within the firm or thought to have been developed internally by the 
company. However, the external network of a company can also be a resource in itself or act as 
an access channel to inimitable and non-substitutable capabilities and resources including 
information. These can be referred to as network resources and they also have the potential to 
create a sustainable competitive advantage for the company. Gnyawali and Madhavan (2001) 
also underline the importance of dynamic resource flows in influencing a firm‟s competitive 
behaviour (see also Gadde et al. 2003). The structure of the network is important especially if 
the relationships are unique compared to others in the industry. Some researchers highlight 
specifically the importance of information and even conceptualize the company relations as 
information networks (Zaheer & Zaheer 1997; see also Gulati 1999). Information provided by 
the network relations enables the firm to act quicker than rivals, which in turn provides a 
strategic advantage.  
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As can be seen, a strategic network is a fairly broad term. It encompasses both horizontal and 
vertical relationships of a firm. By taking a relational approach rather than an atomistic one it 
shifts the focus from within the firm to its surroundings (Gulati et al. 2000). What is then the 
strategic side to it? The interorganisational ties must be enduring and of strategic significance 
for the companies entering them. Examples include strategic alliances, joint ventures and long-
term buyer-supplier relations. When looking closer at a strategic buyer-supplier relationship, 
the network can potentially provide the firm access to information, resources, markets and 
technologies that would otherwise be out of its reach (Gulati et al. 2000). Especially the 
information flows are within the focus of this study.  
 
As a whole, industry structure is characterized by a) the extent of concentration, b) market 
power relative to upstream or downstream industries and c) the extent of collusion –tacit or any 
other (Scherer & Ross 1990; see also Kühn 2005). The structure of an industry radically 
influences its profitability. In existence of an oligopoly or greater concentration, the 
profitability of the companies is higher. A company is assumed to strive for competitive 
advantage from internal capabilities and resources or external industry sources. However, this 
approach fails to look past the single firm entities at the entire industry and how the firms are 
embedded into it. How the firm is situated and related to other companies also has a profound 
impact on the company‟s performance and profitability like discussed earlier. The following 
section takes a deeper look at how organisations are embedded into an industry environment.  
 
2.1.2 Channel Environment 
When identifying a company‟s channel environment it is clearest to start from the centre of 
focus: the relationship of two companies that can be referred to as the focal dyad. Surrounding 
them are different types of environments such as the regulatory environment. A channel dyad 
can be identified simply by examining if „direct, goal oriented social interaction occurs 
between actors in a channel‟ (Achrol et al. 1983; Iacobucci & Hopkins 1992). Noteworthy is 
that transactions within the dyad refer to more than the exchange of physical or monetary 
resources. What is relevant for the scope of this study is that the transactions include also for 
instance exchanges involving information. Fundamental in the discussion of channel dyads is 
in recognising that although the unit of analysis is a dyad, this does not exclude linkages and 
interaction among three or more actors in a channel system. In fact, in order to analyse these 
extra dyadic interactions and influences, it is necessary to identify the unit of analysis. Having 
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identified a channel dyad it is then possible to begin examining its environment. (Achrol et al. 
1983) 
 
Figure 2. Environment of Marketing Channel Dyads 
 
Source: Achrol et al. 1983, 58  
 
In their framework named as „Environment of Marketing Channel Dyads‟ (see figure 1) Achrol 
et al. (1983) discuss what they call environmental pluralism. This refers to the different 
environments and forces that constitute direct and indirect dependencies for a channel dyad.  
The authors distinguish between three different types of environments: The primary and 
secondary task environments and the macro environment. The primary task environment is 
comprised of immediate suppliers and customers of the channel dyad. It is also possible that 
for instance regulatory agencies are part of this environment if they are drawn into direct 
exchange relationships with the dyad. However, typically regulatory agents are part of the 
secondary task environment together with interest aggregators and suppliers of the immediate 
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suppliers as well as customers of the immediate customers. Both direct and potential 
competitors are also categorized as the secondary task environment. Finally, the macro 
environment encompasses social, political, economic and technological forces that shape the 
two task environments. The macro environment cannot be traced back to specific actors like 
the task environments nor can it be acted upon proactively (Achrol et al. 1983).  
 
Achrol et al. (1983) also identify four different sectors/environments (hereafter: sectors) in the 
channel dyad‟s primary and secondary task environments, to which the dyad relates. The input 
and output sectors capture vertical relationships of the channel dyad whereas the competitive 
and regulatory sectors refer to the horizontal relationships. To begin with, the input sector 
consists of the supplier side of the dyad, both direct and indirect actors. Consequently the 
output sector includes all direct and indirect customers, from distributors to end users. The 
competitive sector is comprised of actual and potential competitors and the regulatory sector of 
regulatory groups such as governmental agencies, trade associations and interest groups. When 
a channel dyad is dealing with the regulatory sector the critical dimensions are often related to 
dealing with uncertainty and handling the external dependencies (Achrol et al. 1983).                                                                       
 
The perspective that companies are embedded in an institutional and regulatory environment is 
highlighted also in institutional theory. According to Granovetter (1985) organizations are set 
in networks of social relationships. Also used in literature is the term organizational field, 
which refers to the organizations that constitute a recognised area of institutional life 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Organizational field is also defined by Scott (1995a, 43), who 
highlights that it “helps bound the environments within which institutional processes operate”. 
Taking it a step further, the institutional environment is said to “exert normative pressures for 
the structures and practices of social actors” (DiMaggio & Powell 1983, 148). Scott (1995a) 
also discusses isomorphism, which refers to the structural integration and homogeneity of 
organizations (see also Venard 2009). Organizations acquiesce to the existing environment 
with an aim to fit in their normative environment and become isomorphic (Srikantia 1997). The 
environment is mapped using institutional norms and rules, which are specifications to how 
things should be done and what are the legitimate ways to pursue firm goals (Scott 1995). The 
implication is that companies may even embrace institutional norms and processes that are 
taken for granted and may not be optimal for them (Morgan 1986, Dacin 1997).  
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A company‟s institutional environment is constituted of social actors that include trade 
associations, professional boards, church, unions, governments, politicians, families, 
environmental protection and consumer activist organizations (Scott 1987). These social actors 
shape institutional norms and evaluate the organizational legitimacy of organizations. The 
former – institutional norms – refers to behaviour in the institutional environment that is 
judged according to unwritten rules as acceptable social conduct. The latter – organizational 
legitimacy – shows the end result of the evaluation by the various members of the institutional 
environment. They contrast the organization‟s actions to the existent norms to determine, 
whether the company‟s practices and actions are legitimate and acceptable. (Suchman 1995) 
 
It is noteworthy that the majority of these social actors do not have legal or regulatory power 
over companies or specifically the channel dyads in question. Nevertheless these institutional 
organizations are often able to influence the behaviour of companies due to the need the 
companies have for a larger acceptance. Organizational legitimacy is often an important base 
for support for the company and a factor affecting its financial success. Due to these reasons, 
broader acceptance of company policies is crucial for an organisation (Handelman and Arnold 
1999; Burt and Carralero-Encinas 2000). Yet some parties of the institutional environment 
such as governments and trade associations are able to exert regulatory compliance from 
channel dyads that are acting under their scope. This research focuses more on these types of 
social actors, for instance competition authorities. 
 
It can be argued that organizational legitimacy is ultimately the reason for isomorphism. 
According to claims of the institutional theory, integrated and strong institutional environments 
encourage isomorphism between practices and structures of organizations (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983). Hence, when companies go towards identical practices it is in fact a result of 
companies thriving for industry or consumer acceptance in other words organizational 
legitimacy. Processes of isomorphism are caused by three different types of pressures: 
Legislative, normative and uncertainty-based (applied from DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
Legislative isomorphic pressures result from actors such as the government imposing 
legislations or control mechanisms on companies. Normative pressure is created mainly by 
professional communities and networks which are often rooted in universities or legitimated by 
university credentials. The third type of an isomorphic pressure, uncertainty, is triggered by a 
pinch of assumption and imitation. Organizations may take for granted the structures and 
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practices prevalent in an industry and interpret these as best practices leading to mimetic 
isomorphism.   
 
Coming back to the central dyad and its external channel members, the relationship between 
these two elements can be analysed in four different dimensions (Achrol et al. 1983). First, the 
economic structure of the relationship can be described. This refers to the occurrence of market 
transactions or hierarchical transactions between the channel members. Second, the decision-
making mechanisms are considered in more detail to seek an answer for the question of what 
economic processes are used to establish the terms of trade. Third is the political structure, 
which puts focus on the power relations –whether power is minimal, balanced or imbalanced, 
or centralized. The fourth aspect in describing the relationships of commercial channel 
members are their interactions: what types of sentiments and behaviours are typical? These 
political processes can often be identified as cooperative or conflictive. To sum it up, the four 
dimensions for analysing relationships between a dyad and its direct exchange parties are 
economic and political structure as well as economic and political processes.  
 
2.1.3 Market Concentration 
There are numerous factors that can potentially limit information exchange, industry and 
market structure being one of them. When an industry is highly concentrated it faces a 
challenging set of obstacles (Brock & Obst 2009). However, this analysis needs to be taken 
further from the industry structure of the broader environment to identify how the 
circumstances affect information exchange.  
 
In highly concentrated markets, a few companies have a significant market share and the 
interaction between them is very crucial (Overgaard & Møllgaard 2005). First, the power 
relations between the companies are rarely balanced and at some level of the value chain there 
is a high concentration of power. This can have an adverse effect on information exchange 
since those controlling the information may not see benefits in sharing it and they are protected 
by a strong position. In many cases, high market concentration also draws attention from 
antitrust regulators. Competition authorities analyse the market structure and firm interaction to 
identify possible disrupts to effective competition. Antitrust regulators may need to limit the 
flow of information to guarantee a functioning market economy. Their resolutions have an 
imminent effect on companies and the communication between them. In some situations 
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regulatory decisions can transform the information exchange of entire sectors like discussed in 
the empirical section of this paper. In the coming sections these possibilities are opened up in 
more detail.  
 
When looking at industry structures it is those situations of imperfect competition, such as 
highly concentrated markets which by definition have the most challenges with fair 
competition (Brock & Obst 2009). Highly concentrated markets can take on several forms: The 
ultimate case is monopoly, where there is only one seller of a good (Blythe 2006; Rowley 
2009). In oligopoly situations there are a few sellers. A specific variation of an oligopoly is 
duopoly, which exists when two firms hold a major share of the market (Overgaard & 
Møllgaard 2005). These terms should not be confused with monopsony and oligopsony, which 
refer to the amount of buyers present on the market. This paper will focus on oligopolistic 
cases of highly concentrated markets, which enables the study of information flow between the 
different firms since there are at least two parties (in comparison to a monopoly situation with 
only one firm). It also builds a solid basis for the empirical analysis conducted later in this 
paper.  
 
The typical behaviour of rivalry oligopolists has been to strive towards a monopoly-like stance, 
which is characterized by high prices and limited quantities. However, since there are several 
companies involved it requires a high level of coordination between them to attain such a 
situation. The key is having liberal information flow between the firms: Both parties need 
rather detailed and firm-specific information of past actions and future intentions. In a natural 
state of competition, firms have strong motives to undercut each other‟s prices to take over 
business from them. With increased information flow the firms are able to analyse one 
another‟s behaviour and act faster according to it. The need to make blind-eyed price-cuts is 
not so pressuring since the companies are able to monitor each other‟s comportment (see also 
Uusitalo & Rökman 2007). In addition, any sudden or unexpected actions are quickly noticed 
by the rivalries that follow suit. To sum up, improved information flow between oligopolists 
can be seen as more precise observations, shortened detection lags and in in-depth 
communication of future intentions (Overgaard & Møllgaard 2005). Such a fluid flow of 
information builds the foundation and incentive for coordinated behaviour in a highly 
concentrated market (see also Kovacic et al. 2009). This coordination can be either explicit or 
more subtle and referred to as tacit, in which case the behaviour is not so openly planned and 
discussed between the parties (Anderson et al. 2010, Kahai & Kaserman 2007). 
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The liberal flow of information and well-informed decision making is often regarded as the 
necessary transparency within the market (Georgantzís & Sabater-Grande 2002, Bloomfield & 
O‟Hara 1999). It could be argued that firms need to be able to base their decisions and actions 
on up-to-date information regarding overall sales, price levels and so on. Nevertheless, market 
transparency cannot always be seen in a positive light. In highly concentrated markets a high 
level of transparency may in fact destroy competition (Møllgaard & Overgaard 2000). 
Uncertainty and secrecy can be important elements in markets with high collusion tendency. 
When information is exchanged at high frequency the surprise element of a firm‟s action is 
removed. Their competitors can respond swiftly and all temporary competitive advantages are 
greatly reduced (Møllgaard & Overgaard 2000). Similarly, the deviation from the normative 
behaviour within the collusion can be localized to the specific firm and „penalising‟ actions act 
as an effective deterrent to future „misbehaviour‟.  
 
Although knowing how their rivals have acted in the past, firms still thrive to know how 
business will proceed in the future. In order to do this some, resort to communication with their 
rivals to determine future courses of action. This largely eliminates strategic uncertainty of the 
future and often also intensifies communication of past actions (Van Huyck et al. 1990). 
Knowing one another‟s future intentions frees firms from having to speculate it and take risks 
to stay in the play. Agreeing on such a mode of coordinated practice is critically facilitated by 
the exchange of information between firms. Needless to say, it often violates the antitrust 
objectives - especially the efficient allocation of scarce resources. Since communication is 
central in these types of situations, authorities naturally analyse interfirm interactions closely. 
With contemporary modes of communication it is becoming increasingly hard for antitrust 
authorities to reveal conscious cases of regulatory violations. More often than not, they are 
being tipped by an insider or notified by someone involved (Overgaard & Møllgaard 2005).  
 
From a basic stand point, the positive effects of improving consumer information generally 
prevail. Nevertheless, an isolated situation is impossible and the information always spills over 
to competitors. Ideally antitrust practitioners should attempt to create a system where 
information reaches customers and potential entrants, yet is under veil for vertically placed 
companies. This would promote competitive behavior and aggressive pricing (Guiltinan et al. 
1996, OECD 2001). Realistically such an information exchange pallet is largely a caricature 
and virtually impossible to implement. Therefore regulators should keep in mind that 
intervention does not leave the other side unaffected (Overgaard & Møllgaard 2005). In 
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concentrated markets it is often the consumer side that needs to be flexible in order to limit the 
effects of concentration and not so much vice versa. 
 
2.1.4 External Regulation 
Competition regulation has been developed especially far in the US and the EU starting with 
the Sherman antitrust law in 1890 in the US (Gupta 2002). In the European Union the Act on 
Competition Restrictions lays the premises for the regulation. Each EU country has a local 
competition agency that is the primary responsible for each country. Antitrust regulation is 
often very closely linked to collusive behaviour. In the following antirust regulation will be 
analysed from both a theoretical and a practical standpoint.   
 
Communication between firms and information dissemination play an important role in 
antitrust discussion (Overgaard & Møllgaard 2005; see also Zhang et al. 2006). Both terms 
refer to the distribution and diffusion of information, which is often firm-specific, sensitive and 
strategically relevant to the companies. Antitrust regulators have historically focused on the 
systematic evaluation of sales patterns and price evolvement. This focuses on the analysis of 
how firms have acted. However, it is difficult to define whether oligopolists have acted in a 
monopolistic fashion and adjusted their actions based on those of their competitors. In most 
situations, sufficient data is not available to make reliable conclusions. More recently it has 
been suggested that attention should be shifted to the communication between firms (Kühn 
2001). Regulators should evaluate whether there are practices that facilitate coordination and 
that enlargen the room for collusion. The focus is hence taken away from the historical patterns 
and events, and moved to the channels and methods that can or could be used for this type of 
interaction.  
 
In addition to the flow of information between firms, a lot of theoretical discussion also 
revolves around information flow on the consumer side. There are several distinctions that can 
be made on information flows and who benefit from them. Companies ease customer access to 
price information and product characteristics and give way to comparison shopping. Extreme 
examples are online shop-bots that allow consumers to compare various products or service 
providers. As a result, pricing is also visible to competitors. This leaves little chance for 
companies to succeed without fierce competition or even collusive action. Yet this “consumer 
view” is in potential conflict with the “antitrust view” (Overgaard & Møllgaard 2005). 
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Enabling consumers to compare companies and their products has an increasing effect on the 
amount of competition. However, the consumer view makes the assumption that the 
information given out does not benefit the competing firms. This simple notion may be far-
fetched, since often companies seek exactly this kind of information. What may draw a line 
between the two views is how the information is being transmitted. Antitrust practitioners 
scrutinise the exchange of information between firms, whereas consumer protectionists support 
the flow of information to the consumers. From a regulatory perspective the issue is to find a 
balance between these views and strike an optimal level of market transparency. 
 
In a market of transparent information exchange new entrants and small players are better 
equipped to identify the weak spots of the strongest players and withstand the competition 
(Overgaard & Møllgaard 2005). This is characterized as a potential and important efficiency 
gain of information exchange (see also Georgantzís and Sabater-Grande 2002). As well as 
achieving potential benefits for consumers through increased information flow, it can also 
benefit potential entrants. The entry barriers (Scheffman & Spiller 1992) may be lower since 
potential entrants can seek profit opportunities more effectively. It is noteworthy that this type 
of market benefit can only be achieved if communication is open and not limited between 
distinguished companies. Information may be available to all but practical issues such as the 
cost of the information may deter companies from accessing it and as a result the scope to 
which the information is disseminated becomes limited. Efficiency gains can also be achieved 
within companies in a way that overall competition benefits or consumer interests are met. 
Therefore analysing potential efficiency gains is importantly integrated in the work of antitrust 
practitioners.  
 
Kühn (2001) classifies that communication can be either about future plans or past and present 
actions. Authorities should analyse whether this communication has the potential to facilitate 
coordination or collusion. As a second step, authorities should analyse whether the 
communication has positive efficiency-enhancing effects, which are only achievable thanks to 
the communication (Kühn 2001; Overgaard & Møllgaard 2005). Furthermore, a variant that is 
analyzed is whether the information flow is private or public. Private communication occurs in 
a dual relationship between the two companies whereas public information is available to 
parties outside the dyad (Achrol et al. 1983). Private communication benefits only the two 
firms involved and it is understandably much harder to control. When the information flow 
occurs more in the open it benefits a larger audience, often including new entrants and even 
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consumers. Communication carried out between horizontal competitors – often in private – is 
examined very closely since it is a trigger for antitrust and cartel behavior.  
 
In addition to the previous distinctions, it is also useful to identify whether the information is 
aggregated or individualized (Mumtaz et al. 2009). Antitrust practitioners note this as a very 
important point in their analysis. Individualized information is firm-specific or transaction-
specific and increases the likelihood of collusion more than aggregated information would 
(Overgaard & Møllgaard 2005, Coccorese 2010). Individualized information – also known as 
disaggregated information – encompasses recent and accurate knowledge on the conduct of 
specific firms and hence allows swift and precise reactions from rivals. This type of 
information is very different from aggregated information, which typically is an industry-level 
average or another form of statistics that disguises the individual entities. What usually occurs 
is however not the case each time: In situations where two or three companies hold a 
significant share of the market they are able to pull out individualized information regardless of 
the aggregation. It is especially these cases of concentrated markets that antitrust agencies need 
to scrutinize very carefully.  
 
Laying out suggestions and rules for the application of antitrust to collusion cases is a tough 
challenge that has even been dubbed as impossible by some (Matutes in Kühn 2001). The 
question is whether it is possible to define specific flows of information that have the same 
effects case after case and these flows should hence be treated in the same way. Kühn (2001) 
makes an attempt to do this whilst highlighting the importance of having pre-set guidelines for 
antitrust regulators. He clarifies that some forms of communication need to be prohibited 
within the European Union based on the Art. 81(1)
 3
 of the Treaty of Rome, which is in fact the 
same as Art. 4
4
 of the Competition Act. These read as follows: 
                                                 
3
 Art 81(1) of the Treaty of Rome, Source: European Union, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12002E/htm/C_2002325EN.003301.html; Accessibility verified as of 30.3.2010. 
4
 Art 4 of the Competition Act. Source: FCA home page. http://www.kilpailuvirasto.fi/cgi-
bin/english.cgi?luku=antitrust%2Fcartels&sivu=cartels. Accessibility verified as of 30.3.2010. 
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The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all 
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and 
concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which 
have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition within the common market, and in particular those which: 
a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading 
conditions; 
b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment; 
c) share markets or sources of supply 
d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading 
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial 
usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kühn (2001, 196) defines that such forms of communication generate significant danger of 
collusion without bringing any efficiency benefits that could not be achieved otherwise and 
hence they should be prohibited. Here is a summary of his recommendations:  
1. All private communication of future prices and production plans should be prohibited 
based on the Art. 81(1). It is hard to distinguish efficiency gains in these cases – rather, 
oligopolistic behavior may lift its head. 
2. Public communication of future intentions often includes some sort of commitment 
relative to customers and hence presents efficiency gains. Therefore such 
communication, including future price announcements, should not be considered as a 
violation of the European Union legislation as such.  
3. Disaggregated information exchange about past and present prices and quantities can 
in general be assumed as contra-legislative. It is very hard to justify its efficiency gain 
apart from rare exceptions, for instance the sharing of customer information in the 
banking.   
4. Disaggregated information on past and present cost and demand data is somewhat of a 
grey zone. Kühn suggests treating these situations with the presumption that the 
exchange is nonthreatening. This means that company-specific individualized data of 
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e.g. production costs could be forwarded to competitors if not proven competition-
hindering by the authority.  
5. All aggregated data should be allowed to flow within an industry. Although this may 
provide a challenge from a collusion perspective, the potential efficiency gains are the 
greatest with non-individualized data. Sharing of aggregated data is by default public 
and hence the prohibitions on private communication do not apply to it. Kühn makes a 
strong statement that this type of information flow should not be restricted.  
 
In situations where rule-of-reason treatment is needed it is either the antitrust agents or the 
firms that have the burden to demonstrate their stand in order to change the general rule. In the 
event of individualized price and quantity information it is the firms that need to make an 
„efficiency defence‟ and prove their case so as to avoid a ban. In contrary, individualized cost 
and demand data are presumed to be benign and in this case the antitrust authority should 
prove otherwise before placing a ban. Lastly, Kühn (2001) suggests that in case of aggregated 
data it should also be the authority that proves the adverse effects of the communication before 
applying restrictions on it. An aspect left out of the spotlight in Kühn‟s study is highly 
concentrated markets. How do the above mentioned guidelines apply in those cases? Later 
theorists have taken a stricter approach towards aggregated data: Aforementioned Overgaard & 
Møllgaard (2005, 17) conclude that sharing of aggregated information seems “largely 
innocent”, however antitrust regulators should “carefully check the effective extent of the 
aggregation”. This is central in highly concentrated markets: when exchanging aggregated 
information, the firms may be pulling out information which they are able to disaggregate and 
hence the initially aggregated information should be under prohibition (see also Brock and 
Obst 2007).  
 
Information exchange that infringes regulation often takes place in situations of collusion 
between companies. However, this is not always the case. An often mentioned case in the area 
of antitrust is the UK Agricultural Tractor Registration Exchange in 1992-1994, which was the 
first case the European Commission brought against information sharing without explicit 
allegations of collusion. The case has been analyzed in-depth by Georgantzís and Sabater-
Grande (2002). An information exchange agreement had been in place since 1975 and it was 
based on data from the UK Department of transport concerning retail sales and market shares. 
The UK industry of manufacturers and importer of agricultural tractors was highly 
concentrated where the top four companies were controlling 77 percent of the market and the 
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top eight companies totalled for an 87 percent market share. The disseminated information 
included recent individualized sales data, which raised concern in the antitrust authorities. 
Thus, in addition to historical aggregate data, the companies were able to see firm-level sales 
information of the past months. Being able to detect one another‟s price deviations has 
commonly been considered a key factor to sustaining anti-competitive agreements. 
Assumptions of price deviations could be made based on suddenly increased sales amounts and 
gained market share.  
 
The firms involved in the UK tractor‟s information exchange made an „efficiency defence‟ 
claiming that the information was necessary to process warranty claims and that it bought 
efficiency gain to the entire industry. Nevertheless, the European Commission dismissed this 
by concluding that necessary information could be easily accessed through another route. The 
EC also noted that secrecy was an important element lacking from the industry and it generally 
gives lead time for firms to benefit from competitive actions such as promotional campaigns. 
Communication of individualized sales data had prevented „hidden competition‟ and similarly 
increased entry barriers for newcomers (Overgaard & Møllgaard 2005). The commission 
concluded that own company data and aggregate industry data were sufficient to act on the 
market. Pessimistic sales figures during the years after the prohibition show that there probably 
was some sort of tacit collusive behaviour that was then forced to be abandoned (Georgantzís 
and Sabater-Grande 2002). The authors also conclude that non-price information can be crucial 
for collusive behaviour like in this case, since not all collusion is caused by price information. 
 
Perhaps most importantly, several principles were laid down for further information exchange 
cases in the European agricultural machine manufacturers – and beyond (Georgantzís and 
Sabater-Grande 2002). First, a time frame of twelve months was established for withholding 
individualized sales data before it could be exchanged. As a result the disaggregated data 
should have turned into historical and not permit immediate actions to influence the „present 
day sales‟. Second, aggregated data could only be exchanged if it was supplied by at least three 
firms belonging to different industry or financial groups. This acts as a good guideline and the 
key issue is to distinguish that the companies should not be able to identify one another‟s 
figures from the mass. To sum up, the more public and collective information sharing gets the 
more lenient antitrust authorities are. Likewise, the older the data is, the less is poses a threat to 
competition (Overgaard & Møllgaard 2005).  
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2.2 INFORMATION EXCHANGE RELATIONSHIPS 
A relationship is a connection between two entities with explicit roles, for which there are 
expected norms of behaviour (Ross & Robertson 2007). The entities can be organizations, 
people, societies or even nation-states. Two firms may be connected for instance by a 
customer-supplier or competitor-competitor relationship. Relationships have been elaborately 
analysed by the International Marketing and Purchasing (IMP) Group (Håkansson 1982, 
Håkansson & Snehota 1995, Möller & Halinen 1999, Ford & Håkansson 2006). However, this 
study will follow a slightly different path with stronger focus on the exchange of information. 
Next, the supplier-retailer relationships are analysed in more detail. Focus is put on the 
different types of information, how information is being shared between the firms, and the 
intra-company and relationship-specific factors that affect it.  
 
2.2.1 Internal Company Strategy  
It is worth pointing out the significance of a firm‟s internal strategy (Snow 1997), which is an 
underlying factor for many other elements. Any given strategy generates specific goals and 
objectives. Achrol and Etzel (2003) argue that the combination of task environment 
characteristics and reseller goals generates higher reseller performance. The authors also note 
that “channel member goals have played a secondary role in marketing channel theory” (2003, 
148). They continue to identifying three different goal priorities for retailers:  
(a) Productivity goals 
(b) Market adaptation goals  
(c) Channel integration goals  
 
The authors link the goal setting to the design of internal resource flows as well as to the 
offering of services and resources to firms in the network. The claim is that traditional 
mechanisms of control, such as market power, no longer foster good relations and emphasis 
should be turned to incentive-type offerings, such as the sharing of market information (Achrol 
& Etzel 2003). A conclusion that can be drawn from their research is that information sharing 
is a result of specific reseller goals and ultimately an important route to better reseller 
performance. Any strategically thinking company is prone to follow or prioritize one of the 
goals identified by Achrol and Etzel (2003). This has implications on the private dyad 
relationship between the retailer and their supplier, including the information exchange that is 
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carried out (Gadde et al. 2003). Next, the three different goal priorities are discussed in more 
detail. 
 
To start with, a firm that is oriented towards productivity goals is likely to put effort on 
controlling operating costs and improving revenue flows of the business (Scott 1987). They 
aim to improve productivity and efficiency of their processes. From the supplier field these 
kinds of companies await efficiencies and leniency in credit terms and margins. The second 
potential goal prioritization for retailers is market adaptation goals. These types of companies 
focus on offering “superior selection, quality, location or customer service” (Achrol & Etzel 
2003). Key issues are flexibility to market needs and openness to the environment (Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978). These types of companies often have strong customer focus and this is 
something they also expect from their suppliers. Lastly, the third direction companies can aim 
to are integration goals (Stern et al. 1996; see also Su et al. 2008). These highlight open 
communication and information sharing to strengthen the structural and relational ties with 
supplier firms. The aim is to integrate channel operations and facilitate seamless cooperation 
with the upstream value chain.  
 
As a whole, the impact of company strategy is critical to the actions they pursue. These actions 
are then visible for instance in the processes and nature of information exchange that they take 
on. In the empirical part of the study the retailers are analysed also based on their strategic 
direction and goal prioritization.  
 
2.2.2 Dimensions of Commitment 
The topic of market information is elaborately discussed up by Frazier (1999). As he puts it, 
channel members typically process and retain information on the marketplace. A critical 
dimension of the marketplace is the relationships with other firms, service providers and trade 
associations. The information they retain is also known as intelligence (see also Lackman et al. 
2000). Channel members with better market intelligence are likely to be more market oriented 
and enjoy several advantages. Namely, the sharing of intelligence can potentially alleviate 
decision-making uncertainty and give an advantage in forming and implementing marketing 
strategies. In contemporary business, the significance of electronic data sharing is also obvious. 
Electronic sharing is transforming many channel relationships and it is also elementary to the 
success of efficient consumer response (ECR) systems. The importance of data sharing 
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increases when a channel system faces high environmental uncertainty and competition. In 
these types of situations the freshness of intelligence is also vital. The significance of having 
market information is highlighted also in the most recent scholarly discussions. Frazier et al. 
(2009) discuss distributor-supplier sharing of what they call strategic information.  
 
The relationship context of information exchange has a solid scholarly background in the 
Exchange Theory. Blau (1964) has been an important influencer in this discussion and he 
proposes that parties evaluate past experiences and future expectations, from the basis of which 
they then consider the potential cost, benefits and risks of alternative courses of action. He 
suggests that the option that is selected, should the one with the highest expected net benefits 
on the long term. Over four decades later Frazier et al. (2009) underline similar reasoning. 
According to them, distributors make the choice of sharing strategic information based on 
factors affecting perceived benefits, costs, and risks. Suppliers can increase the amount of 
strategic information given to them by distributors by enhancing the benefits and decreasing 
the costs and risks perceived by the distributor. 
 
Market information has also been spoken off as strategic information. This focus can be 
justified since the gathering and exchange of market information is primarily a strategic matter 
– rather than a tactical exercise (Frazier et al. 2009; see also Nakata & Sivakumar 1996). Two 
different types of strategic information can be distinguished within a distributor organisation: 
internal and external strategic information. External Strategic Information (ESI) refers to 
processed and retained data concerning the distributor‟s customers and competitors. In 
contrast, Internal Strategic Information (ISI) is processed and retained data on future plans of 
the distributor. Both types of information are of value to the distributor as well as the suppliers. 
Strategic information – by definition – has implications for the company‟s long-term decision 
making and therefore both ESI and ISI can enhance a firm´s competitive advantage.  
 
Various characteristics of the exchange relationship or environment may facilitate or enhance 
the sharing of ESI and ISI and in contrast other factors may decrease the sharing of them. The 
different aspects that can be analysed include interdependence and specialized investments 
within an exchange relationship as well as the uncertainty of the surrounding business 
environment. The factors affect ESI sharing differently than they affect ISI sharing due to the 
distinctions between these two types of strategic information. The nature of internal strategic 
information is more proprietary and sensitive. These issues may make the distributor more 
27 
 
reluctant to share ISI information than ESI information. Furthermore, it is only possessed by 
the top management and cannot be obtained by suppliers from other sources in the company. 
ESI in contrary is often available to the suppliers also from other sources than the distributor, 
such as industry studies or surveys. These compose the two critical dimensions that distinguish 
the pair of strategic information: sensitivity and accessibility (Frazier et al. 2009).  
 
The factors that affect the sharing of strategic information can roughly be divided into three 
categories: First, those that are related to the exchange relationship, such as the magnitude of 
interdependence between the supplier and the distributor. Second, characteristics specific to the 
distributor or supplier, as an example distributor product-market familiarity. Lastly, 
characteristics of the environment, where environmental uncertainty can be highlighted. 
Environmental uncertainty is the level at which it is difficult to accurately predict the future. 
The figure below visualises all these factors.  
 
Figure 3. Distributor Sharing of Strategic Information with Suppliers  
 
 
Source: Frazier et al. 2009, 33 
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Next, the dimensions presented by Frazier et al. (2009) in figure 3 are analysed in more detail. 
To start with, a supplier and distributor are not always equally dependent on their relationship. 
When this type of dependence asymmetry favours the distributor, there is an exchange 
relationship in which the supplier‟s dependence is higher. Vice versa, the distributor is more 
dependent on the fruitful continuation and development of the relationship when dependence 
asymmetry is in the favour of the supplier. According to studies, distributors are more likely to 
share ESI and ISI information when there is dependence asymmetry favouring the distributor 
(Frazier et al. 2009). Nonetheless, there is no support for the claim that the tendency to share 
strategic information would be decreased if the dependence asymmetry is flipped around. 
However, information sharing in dependence asymmetry situations is effected by 
environmental uncertainty as well as the type of strategic information that is in question (see 
also Cannon et al. 2000).  
 
In environmental uncertainty, distributors are less likely to share internal strategic information 
(ISI) (Frazier et al. 2009). This could be explained by risk minimisation due to higher 
unpredictability of the future of the exchange relationship. Additionally, it could also be a way 
for distributors to maintain their flexibility in supplier relationships by reducing resource 
commitments to individual suppliers. Davis (1993) identifies three different sources of 
environmental uncertainty: demand uncertainty, supply uncertainty and technological 
uncertainty. In alleviating these uncertainties he turns to the quality of relationships in the 
supply chain. This is supported by Fynes et al. (2004), who claim that in uncertain times firms 
can turn to their partners to draw necessary resources in order to sustain performance.  
 
In situations where the distributor and supplier both perceive their exchange relationship 
essential to their goal achievement, the relationship is characterized by a high interdependence 
magnitude (Frazier et al. 2009, see also Sezen & Yilmaz 2007). One could imagine that 
information exchange would increase in this situation, yet empirical studies show no support 
for the claim. Nevertheless, this type of a relationship does have a positive effect: when sharing 
internal strategic information it counterbalances the risks perceived by distributors in an 
uncertain environment. In other words, if there is a high interdependence magnitude, 
distributors are likely to be keener in sharing ISI with suppliers in environmental uncertainty 
than when such interdependence does not exist.  
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It is noteworthy that negative effects of various factors are more visible on the sharing of ISI. 
Issues that impact the sharing of ESI are not so clear-cut; It would have been logical that 
environmental uncertainty would encourage ESI sharing since this could increase the supplier‟s 
means of interpreting the changing conditions and hence have a positive effect on the 
distributor‟s sales. However, this type of hypotheses is not supported by empirical results –not 
even in cases of strong interdependence between the two companies. The sharing of external 
strategic information is however indirectly affected by the amount of ESI possessed by the 
distributor. When distributors have a high product-market familiarity they can access in-depth 
customer and competitor information with less time and effort. In this type of a situation it is 
likely that distributors will share more ESI with their suppliers. Distributor trust in the supplier 
has been analysed to a great extent (Moorman et al. 1992, Sezen & Yilmaz 2007, Ghosh & 
Fedorowitz 2008, Wang et al. 2008). The impact of this trust on ESI has not been identified, 
yet it is not thought to be relevant (Frazier et al. 2009). In contrary, the effects of trust on 
sharing internal strategic information have a positive correlation. This means that distributors 
are significantly more prone to sharing ISI when they feel that the supplier is reliable and not 
likely to behave opportunistically.    
 
How do financial investments within the relationship then affect information sharing? These 
investments refer to non-recoverable expenditures made by either the distributor or the supplier 
to support the sales of the supplier‟s products by the distributor organisation. Investments made 
by the distributor are referred to as Distributor Transaction-Specific Investments (DTSI) and 
accordingly investments made by the supplier are Supplier Transaction-Specific Investments 
(STSI) (see also Brown et al. 2009). In exchange relationships with DTSI or STSI distributors 
are keener to share their internal and external strategic information. In the case of DTSI the 
distributor makes a commitment to support the supplier and wants to make sure they reap 
maximum benefits by expanding the information flow. Likewise, STSI shows that the supplier 
is willing to support the distributor in selling its products and is unlikely to misuse strategic 
information as this would jeopardize their own STSI. As a logical consequence, distributors are 
typically more willing to share ESI and ISI when transaction-specific investments occur. 
Supplier transaction-specific investments have an additional benefit that is evident during 
environmental uncertainty. Like discussed earlier, distributors are generally more wary to share 
ISI when uncertainty is high due to concerns of opportunistic behaviour. STSIs signal the 
supplier‟s interest to maintain a good and reliable relationship, thus distributors are 
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significantly less concerned about sharing their internal strategic information as it may also 
improve coordination between the firms and enhance the potential benefits.   
 
To complement the discussion before, Krogh et al. (2001) take the perspective of the supplier. 
Even in markets with high retailer power, it cannot be assumed that suppliers will always 
follow retailers‟ lead instead of fulfilling their own goals. The authors identify three different 
information needs that are driven by supplier objectives. The suppliers are generally interested 
in accumulating information that a) increases their efficiency, b) maximizes innovation or c) 
aids in risk management. When retailers analyse their information sharing strategy it would be 
useful for them to keep in mind the suppliers interests as specified above. 
 
Kühn (2001) makes a twofold distinction between a) future planned actions and b) past or 
present actions. In both cases, firms communicate about their behaviour and conduct. 
Communication on future intension is non-verifiable and soft information, such as planned 
production, pricing or product launch information. Communication of past or present conduct 
is verifiable and hard information. This can be for instance information on customers, contract 
terms with suppliers and past or present prices. All in all, if relational behaviours are present in 
a channel setting, there are multiple positive consequences that at the end can improve a firm‟s 
performance and profitability (Sezen & Yilmaz 2007, Fink et al. 2007). These include 
improved coordination (Noordewier et al. 1990) and efficiency in logistics (Dahlstrom et al. 
1996). Some retailers pursue these goals in their value chain management, which is illustrated 
in the empirical part of this study.  
 
2.2.3 Compound Interaction 
The relationship that occurs between two firms may actually be comprised of a multitude of 
relationships. Two firms may be connected for instance by a customer-supplier or competitor-
competitor relationship. This is referred to as a simple relationship (Ross & Robertson 2007). 
However, it is not uncommon that two firms are joined together by several simple 
relationships. In these situations the relationship that a channel dyad member has with an 
exterior party is in fact a multiplicity of relationships (Bengtsson & Kock 1999). In this case, 
rather than focusing on the simple relationships that constitute it, Ross and Robertson (2007) 
argue that a company should look at the compound relationship. This is also valid when 
thinking of information exchange in the interaction: all the simple relationships are interlinked 
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and information sharing needs to be considered on the broad arena. The compound relationship 
contains all the simple dyadic relationships which exist between the pair of firms. Figure 4 
illustrates the different patterns of compound relationships.  
 
Figure 4. Patterns of Compound Relationships 
  
Source: Ross & Robertson 2007, 111 
 
Looking at the „big picture‟ of the compound relationship enables shifting focus from the mere 
simple relationships between a set of two companies. As seen in the figure 4, simple 
relationships between two firms can be categorized into four types: customer to supplier, 
supplier to customer, competitor to competitor and partner to partner. This leads to 11 different 
types of compound relationships, out of which one contains all four simple relationships. Ross 
and Robertson (2007) argue that it is important to distinguish that a compound relationship 
does not refer to a cluster of simple relationships between more than two companies, but 
focuses on the multiplicity of facets the interaction between two companies can have. 
 
Compound relationships are important due to very straightforward reasons. If a company 
focuses only on separate simple relationships it has with another firm, it runs the risk of 
missing the overall situation (Winer 2001). The business relationship may start leaning towards 
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a specific simple relationship, in turn neglecting or even harming another simple relationship. 
To give an example, two companies may be in a customer-supplier relationship, yet also 
competitors of one another. If the simple relationship of being competitors is emphasized, the 
other simple relationship - customer-supplier - may not reach its full potential and can be 
negatively affected. Hence it is crucial to keep track of the various simple relationships that 
constitute the compound relationship that ties two companies to one another (Ross & 
Robertson 2007).  
 
Ross and Robertson (2007) highlight several important issues on how simple relationships may 
differ within a compound relationship. First, the behaviour and norms of individual simple 
relationships may be in conflict with those of other simple relationships. One could imagine 
this leading to challenging situations especially if the same practitioners get involved is 
different simple relationships. In addition, firms may have different roles in the different 
simple relationships. These roles often vary in terms of their power relations and potential for 
opportunistic behaviour. In one simple relationship a company may be in a position to lay 
down terms, whereas in another simple relationship between the same two companies, the 
power relation could be opposite. Additional challenges are catered by the non-sequential and 
volatile nature of a compound relationship. Since the relationships do not occur sequentially, 
partnership and competing may occur at the same time. Adding to this complexity is still the 
changing nature of the compound relationship, which can practically alter any of the earlier 
configurations such as the power relations. Ergo, managers must constantly monitor the 
compound relationship as a whole.  
 
The possibility of having both competitive and cooperative simple relationships at the same 
time has been brought up in theoretical discussion and is referred to as coopetition (Bengtsson 
& Kock 1999). What has previously been seen as the two polar ends of a continuum are argued 
by Lado et al. (1997) to be two separate – yet interrelated – aspects of a relationship. Gnyawali 
& Madhavan (2001) also underline that competition and cooperation can coexist. According to 
them this is surprisingly often the case and as a result the performance of the partner firms is in 
fact enhanced. 
 
Within a compound relationship it is often possible to define a simple relationship that is likely 
to be more important than the other ones and that affects the compound relationship more than 
the other simple relationships. This type of a simple relationship can be labelled as a dominant 
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relationship (Ross & Robertson 2007). The authors identify three factors that could be used to 
determine the dominant relationship. The first one puts weight on the history of the two 
companies and suggests that the first relationship they originally had, such as supplier to 
customer, builds path dependence (see also Arthur 1989). It may be difficult to introduce new 
ways of action to other simple relationships. The norms of the original relationship may be 
portrayed in the entire compound relationship. The last two factors look more at the 
profitability of the simple relationships.  
 
Winer (2001) logically argues that firms should focus more on those relationships and 
customers that are most important to them. The term economic importance is used when the 
current profitability is underscored, whereas the future potential is valued through strategic 
importance. This distinction separates the relationships that already create profitability from 
those that are expected to yield income in the future. If a firm is able to identify a simple 
relationship that has more economic or strategic importance than the others, this relationship 
then has increased likelihood of being the dominant relationship within the dyad‟s compound 
relationship. Information exchange within the compound relationship is an interesting issue. 
When companies have several simple relationships between them, such as supplier-partner, the 
tendency for opportunistic behaviour is reduced (Ross & Robertson 2007).     
 
In analysing compound relationships further it is evident that simple relationships affect one 
another like mentioned before. After having constantly monitored compound relationships, 
there are three clear reasons why managers should pay attention to the dyad relationship as a 
whole. Foremost, making mistakes or performing under expectations in one simple relationship 
may harm the other relationships (Ross & Robertson 2007). For instance, neglecting accounts-
payable obligations as a customer may harm another simple relationship of being a supplier. 
Controversially, having one successful simple relationship may also have negative effects on 
the other simple relationships. This is especially true if the success is one-way and the situation 
is not equally win-win between the two members. The last issue to point out is that good 
performance in one simple relationship may lead to additional relationships within the same 
dyad. Through building stronger commitment between the dyad members in a simple 
relationship, it is logical that the compound relationship deepens. Dwyer et al. (1987) propose 
that buyer-seller relationships move through stages. Good buyers or sellers may be asked to be 
partners –or successful competitors may be of interest in joint product development efforts. To 
summarize, poor or cut-throat performance in a simple relationship can cause negative effects 
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on the other simple relationships. Then again, mutual positive experiences in a simple 
relationship are likely to be mirrored beyond that one simple relationship to the benefit of the 
entire compound relationship. An individual simple relationship that may not be significant can 
however aid the compound relationship. Due to these considerations Brandenburger and 
Nalebuff (1996) argue that paying attention to the larger relationship can be both protective and 
proactive.  
 
A construct often spoken of is social networks. This terminology should not be misinterpreted 
as compound relationships, since social networks are conceptually broader and in fact 
encompass several compound relationships. As Gulati et al. (2000, 23) put it, a firm‟s social 
network “encompass[es] a firm‟s set of relationships, both horizontal and vertical, with other 
organizations –be they suppliers, customers, competitors or other entities –including 
relationships across industries and countries”. Looking at dyadic relationships, it can be seen 
that they are actually the links that constitute the social network. Different sets of dyads within 
the channel can be composed into a multiplex network. Going back to compound relationships, 
they can now be seen as each link in the company‟s social network. The amount of connections 
between two nodes equals the amount of compound relationships in the network.   
 
2.2.4 Market Power and Orientation 
At times the power relations of an industry may not be in equilibrium, possibly leading to 
unbalanced allocation and flow of information between buyers and sellers. This type of a 
scenario makes it difficult to achieve “fair, open, accessible, efficient and transparent markets” 
(Carstensen 2008, 271). Disproportionate market power can emerge either as buyer power or 
seller power. Recently large retailers have been noticed for their strong buyer power and have 
faced concern and debate regarding it (Carstensen 2008; see also Mitchell et al. 2003). Buyer 
power can be a problem both from the perspective of competition policy as well as antitrust 
law. In some cases a supplier exercises seller power over its buyer or merely in relation to other 
suppliers. An example of such situations are Category Captain arrangements (Desrochers et al. 
2003; see also Gelderman et al. 2008).  
 
The extent of market power consists of a firm‟s horizontal and vertical influence and the 
capabilities of its internal departments. These must all be compared to competing firms of the 
relevant market and to the average of that category (Steiner 2008). Steiner argues that 
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competition exists also in vertical buyer-seller relationships, which is something new from the 
perspective of competition regulation. Anyhow, for the purposes of this study we shall focus 
on horizontal competition and analyse the vertical relationships from the market power (buyer 
power) perspective. Market power emerges as various reward and coercive powers as well as 
legitimate authority, such as contracts (Achrol 1997). Perloff et al. (2007) pinpoint that the 
extent that firms exert market power has an impact on economic policies such as antitrust 
regulation.  
 
By definition, buyer power arises from the ability of retail firms to obtain from suppliers more 
favourable terms than those available to other buyers or would otherwise be expected under 
normal competitive conditions (Clarke et al. 2002). According to the OECD (1998), buyer 
power is achieved when a retailer is able to threaten to impose a long-term opportunity cost (in 
other words harm or withheld benefit) with relations to its supplier. This interlinks buyer power 
with bargaining power (Chen 2008). Seeing the challenges that buyer power brings to 
information sharing it may be tempting to think that a relationship with a supplier power 
advantage changes the situation. To some extent this is the case: powerful suppliers can gain 
distributor compliance (Frazier et al, 2009). Controversially, however, they are rarely able to 
push buyers to share strategic information (Frazier et al., see above). According to some 
studies the exercising of market power is reduced as a relationship becomes more relational 
(Macneil 1981).  
 
Retailer buyer power can be analysed by looking at the market shares of the retailers as well as 
by calculating the amount of total sales of a product line bought by the retailer (Carstensen 
2008). Depending on the industries and geographical areas a purchase percentage of 20-30 
percent has been sufficient to create considerable power over suppliers. This is lower than 
could be expected, yet studies show the influence can be achieved with even smaller 
percentages. In the U.K. grocery trade a 10 percent buying amount of the total sales of a 
product line already gave way to buyer power (Dobson, 2005). In highly concentrated sectors, 
such as the Finnish retail market where the two largest retailers control 73 percent of the 
market, it could therefore be expected that the power advantage is to the favour of these buyers. 
They are very likely to be buying well over a half of the products sold by the producers.  
 
A crucial issue that affects information sharing is the company‟s internal willingness to 
distribute the information they have. In some situations, a company such as a buyer, may be at 
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a power advantage. This often gives then more flexibility to determine whether or not they 
want to share market information with their suppliers. From a basic standpoint it is 
understandable that in order for a firm to share market information that it possesses, it should 
see the added value of this action. Ultimately, both suppliers and retailers exist to serve the 
needs of end consumers. This focus can be referred to as market orientation. An important 
motivating or deterring factor to sharing market information is market orientation (Sigauw et al 
1998). 
 
Market orientation refers to the degree to which a firm focuses on the needs and preferences of 
end consumers as well as competitor initiatives (Sigauw et al 1998). It is possible to focus 
either on the market orientation of the firm or the market orientation of its dyad company. 
Market orientation is portrayed in an organisation-wide generation of market intelligence and 
dissemination of the intelligence across departments followed by organisation-wide 
responsiveness to it (Kohli & Jaworski 1990). How then does market orientation affect 
information sharing and vice versa – how does the existence or lack of market information 
affect market orientation? The linkage of channel communications and market orientation was 
first brought up by Siguaw et al. (1998; see also Frazier 1999). They found that market 
orientation of the supplier organization is positively related to the market orientation of the 
distributor, and distributor commitment to the dyadic exchange relationship. This is very 
revealing as it highlights how market orientation is in fact transferred downstream the value 
chain.  
 
Market oriented firms underscore the importance of the end customers and are likely to be 
interested in attaining detailed market information on them. Higher commitment to a 
relationship is a key attribute to sharing strategic market information. Blesa and Bigné (2005) 
conclude that a manufacturer‟s market orientation has a positive effect on distributor 
satisfaction and dependence on the dyadic relationship. Furthermore, Sigauw et al. (1998, 106) 
highlight that a “distributor‟s market orientation has a direct effect on its trust and perception 
of cooperative norms”. The implementation of these studies is that there is a clear relation 
between market orientation and commitment to the dyadic information exchange. Coming back 
to the findings of Frazier et al. (2009), distributor trust in the supplier promotes the sharing of 
internal strategic information. In conclusion, it could be argued that market orientation is likely 
to have a positive influence on information sharing from the distributor side to their suppliers.  
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The transfer of market orientation from distributor to supplier can also be viewed from another 
perspective. Suppliers are heavily reliant on distributors for market information, which is 
underlined by Coughlan et al. (2006). Distributors are more likely to be in direct contact with 
competitors and end customers, and hence possess information of interest to suppliers. 
Therefore, it could be argued that market orientation is not passed on from distributors to 
suppliers, but it is rather enabled by distributors through information sharing.  
 
Distributors are often unwilling to share information with suppliers (Frazier et al. 2009). One 
reason for this is that information may be sensitive in nature and hence could put the distributor 
at risk of opportunistic behaviour. However the reason can also be more practical: distributors 
often face resource constraints, such as time and opportunity costs in addition to having a large 
number of suppliers. Constraints such as these hamper the sharing of information. Lastly, there 
are also underlying reasons which lessen the interest of distributors to share information. Like 
discussed earlier, it is important that the distributor sees benefits in their action. This may be 
difficult if the benefits of information exchange are not clearly evident or are indirect.  
 
2.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
 
The conceptual model below brings together the theoretical discussion of this chapter. Figure 5 
illustrates that a supplier and a retailer are embedded in a dyad relationship. They are also 
interacting with other organisations both horizontally and vertically. The entire network of 
companies is impacted by how they are positioned in the channel and what their ties are to one 
another. Moreover, regulatory agents play an important role in the surrounding environment. 
The value chain of a market has been illustrated in a very simplified manner by indicating the 
existence of an upstream and downstream supply chain. On the downstream side the next step 
is the consumer.  
 
The framework also pinpoints the environment and relationship factors that affect information 
exchange between the dyad and beyond. A total of six factors mirror the influence of the 
companies‟ environment. Similarly, eight elements have been identified from the relationship 
and intra-company side. As a whole these are the factors that have arisen from the previous 
theoretical discussion in this chapter. In the empirical section of this research the framework 
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above is challenged within the Finnish retail context. A refined framework is thereafter 
constructed at the end of chapter 4.  
 
 
Figure 5. Conceptual Model of the Factors Affecting Information Exchange    
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3 METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY 
Key factors influencing information exchange were identified in the theoretical framework in 
section 2.3. In the empirical part of the study the significance of each is analysed and 
concluding results are presented in a refined framework in section 4.5. To achieve this, the 
larger network of companies and institutions in the Finnish retail sector are analysed. 
Therefore, instead of focusing on a specific dyadic relationship between two industry actors we 
take into consideration a total of 11 organisations and evaluate the effect of the termination of 
ScanTrack –based information exchange on a larger arena. ScanTrack data is essentially bar 
code data from cash registers of retail traders (see also O‟Brian 1990). It measures sales to 
consumers product-specifically. The scope of this study includes the analysis of how the 
ScanTrack system and data from it was used within the daily consumer goods industry, what 
led to the abandoning of the system – including the impact of extra-dyadic factors such as 
regulatory agents – and how the new situation affects the stakeholders in the industry. 
Furthermore, some light is shed to the future of information exchange in the sector and what 
prospects are envisaged by the organisations that are interviewed. This study is hermeneutic 
and aims to increase understanding of a matter by describing the situations and events.  
 
The thesis is conducted as part of the KAULIN
5
 research initiative. KAULIN is an 
abbreviation of the Finnish term ‟Kaupan Arvoketjun Liiketoimintamallien Innovointi‟, which 
in English stands for „Innovation of the business models of the retail trade value chain‟. It is a 
research initiative between four Universities and business schools in Finland, including the 
Helsinki School of Economics (Aalto University School of Economics since 2010). The focus 
of the research project is on the entire retail value chain from the manufacturers to the end 
consumers. Within these parameters the networks, relationships and business models - among 
other issues - are analyzed. Partner companies of the project include Kesko (retail trader) and 
Unilever (supplier), which took part in this study. Although these companies represent an 
important dyad in the research, it became evident in the early stages of the study that including 
other companies would give important added value, also to the two before mentioned 
companies. Therefore the scope was broadened to include other firms, unions and the Finnish 
Competition Authority. The research was conducted through qualitative theme interviews as 
discussed in the next section. The full list of interviewed companies and persons can be found 
                                                 
5
 Kaulin is the Finnish word for a rolling pin i.e. the cylindrical food preparation utensil that is used to shape and 
flatten dough. 
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in Table 1 and a more detailed table including the dates when the discussions took place is in 
Appendix 1.  
 
This study has altogether eleven stakeholders: one regulator, four trade 
associations/federations, three producers/suppliers and three representatives of the grocery 
retailers. The FCA is the major influencer from a regulatory perspective. Trade associations 
and federations that represent the interests of their member companies can also be referred to 
as trusteeships. These include PTY, which is interviewed on the retailer side and ETL & TY 
from the supplier side. ECR is a trusteeship representing the broader value chain. The industry 
standpoint is represented by Unilever, Mars and Haribo, whereas the trade view is portrayed 
through Kesko Food and S Group as well as the logistics and sourcing company of the latter, 
Inex Partners.  
 
3.1 STAKEHOLDERS OF THE STUDY 
On the retailer side the research is focused on the two major players, SOK and Kesko, which 
held a total market share of 73,4 percent in 2006, which is the year that FCA uses in their 
analysis of the ScanTrack case. The suppliers included in the study are Unilever, Mars and 
Haribo. These are all multinational branded packed consumer goods manufacturers, which 
represent companies, and products that are market leaders as well as some products that do not 
have a leading market share in Finland. All three suppliers have purchased ScanTrack data. 
These stakeholders enable building a good view of the reactions companies had and the impact 
they felt when information exchange through ScanTrack was abandoned. In addition, 
interviews are conducted at the Finnish Competition Authority to better understand their 
activities and the specifics of the ScanTrack study. These discussions ensure that the FCA‟s 
stance on the matter in correctly interpreted and their latest views can be included in the 
analysis.  
 
The association representing the retailers (Finnish Grocery Trade Association) and those of the 
suppliers (Finnish Food and Drink Industries‟ Federation & Finnish Cosmetic, Toiletry and 
Detergent Association) help build a coherent view of the industry and broaden the scope of the 
study beyond the individual firms and onto a more general level. These associations are chosen 
based on how central they are in the industry, which is highlighted in numerous references 
these specific instances are given in the interview discussions with other companies. ECR 
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Finland (GS1) is also interviewed since they are a forum for communication between retailers 
and suppliers and view the entire supply chain as well as the end consumer. ECR Finland is 
also mentioned in several other interviews and is clearly relevant to the market. This research 
does not entail the perspective of the company providing the service, AC Nielsen.  
 
Most of the interviews are carried out during the year 2009, with the exception of one earlier 
interview during spring 2008 with Seppo Salo (Unilever, 1
st
 interview) and one later interview 
in January 2010 with Sari Karjomaa (TY). Likewise, the interviews are conducted primarily 
face-to-face with the exception of three phone conversations: Timo Rajanen (Haribo), Seppo 
Salo (Unilever, 2
nd
 interview) and Sari Karjomaa (TY). The phone interview with Sari 
Karjomaa was followed by additional information via email. All interviews are conducted and 
transcribed in Finnish. It is very pleasing to notice that the interviewees had a positive attitude 
towards the study and the discussions that took place. In some aspects the topic is sensitive, 
however only a few questions are left unanswered. Now and then there is slight unwillingness 
to discuss for instance specific b-to-b relations, but the amount of interviews guarantees that 
the whole picture is portrayed well. Some information is like puzzle pieces from different 
sources that needs to be put together to build a cohesive and comprehensive portrayal of the 
reality.  
 
The interviews were recorded almost without exception and the recordings were written out 
into transcripts to support analysis. Attention was paid to both what was being said and also to 
how it was expressed (Holstein & Gubrium 2002). Notes were made of the general atmosphere, 
flow of the interview and non-verbal communication (such as hesitation or a surprised 
reaction). Many specialists (see for instance Bryman 2004) underline the importance of noting 
and analysing all non-verbal communication and observations made during the interview. As 
an important note, none of the interviewees seemed alarmed by the recorder like may 
sometimes be the case and likewise no-one refused recording. Therefore it is not probable that 
the interviews lost any richness due to being taped.   
 
A total of 15 industry representatives from 11 organisations are interviewed for this study. 
Next, all these stakeholder firms are presented in more detail and their linkage to ScanTrack is 
introduced. 
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The Finnish Competition Authority (FCA) – Regulator 
Founded in 1988, the Finnish Competition Authority (FCA) operates under the Finnish 
„Ministry of Employment and the Economy‟. According to FCA‟s website its objective is to 
“protect sound and effective economic competition and to increase economic efficiency in both 
private and public-sector activity”6. By doing this the organisation aims to guarantee free and 
well-functioning competition as well as equal competition conditions for companies.  
 
The FCA has a central if not even a defining role in the abolishment of the ScanTrack system. 
After the information exchange in the daily consumer goods trade was brought to their notice, 
the FCA opened investigation in a case that was led by Director Kirsi Laine. The examination 
sought answers to whether the ScanTrack information that was exchanged between the retail 
traders was competition-hindering. FCA published their final results in Diary 154/61/2007 in 
June 2008 and the case was closed without any penalties being issued.  
  
ECR Finland ry / GS1 Finland Oy – Association 
Efficient Consumer Response Finland is a cooperative association between grocery traders and 
industry suppliers. The association‟s goal is to encourage cooperation and optimize operations 
throughout the entire value chain from raw material producers and suppliers, to retailers and 
the end consumer. ECR has established numerous process models related to for instance 
product launches and product identification. Ultimately the goal is to maximize consumer 
benefit by meeting their needs faster, better and with lower expenses. ECR‟s work in Finland is 
developed and coordinated together with GS1 Finland Oy.  
 
ECR Finland provides a unique arena for the supplier and retailer sides of the consumer goods 
industry to meet. At the time of the ScanTrack transformation as well as in the months 
following the events, the various stakeholders met to discuss their interests and to seek forms 
of information exchange that would be in the frames of competition regulations and satisfy 
both the retailers and the suppliers.  
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 The Finnish Competition Authorities,  http://www.kilpailuvirasto.fi/cgi-bin/english.cgi?luku=about-
us&sivu=about-us, accessibility verified 20.2.2010 
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Finnish Grocery Trade Association (PTY
7
) – Retailer trade association  
Members of the PTY are associations and enterprises working in the grocery trade sector. In 
representing their interests it develops the shared operating conditions shared by its member 
companies as well as those of the grocery trade in general. These goals are undertaken through 
business policy initiatives, such as those to lower indirect taxation and dismantle regulations 
seen unnecessary by the traders. PTY‟s members' share of the Finnish retail market for 
groceries is as high as 95%.  
 
Interaction between direct competitors on the field is restricted to a high extent; however the 
grocery traders are able to discuss issues regarding information exchange on a general level. 
This has been the situation also after the ScanTrack based information gathering and exchange 
was terminated. The grocery retailers have weighed their options and heard out each other‟s 
interests in the types of cooperation they are interested to have with other industry actors such 
as suppliers. Moreover, they have taken a common stance to the forwarding of cash register 
data. PTY represents the grocery traders also within ECR as they meet the supplier side at a 
round table.  
 
Finnish Food and Drink Industries‟ Federation (ETL8) – Supplier trade association 
The ETL has around 300 member companies, which represent 90% of grocery production in 
Finland. The federation‟s aim is to enhance the operating possibilities and conditions of its 
member companies through six separate strategic goals, which they strive towards: 1) a flexible 
& renewable labor market; 2) enhanced appreciation of the food and drink industries; 3) 
preserving and thriving of competitive and high quality domestic raw ingredient production; 4) 
a profitably operating consumer driven value chain; 5) a regulatory environment that enables 
and enhances operations; 6) production of Finnish groceries in a responsible and 
environmentally sensitive manner.  
 
Abolishment of the ScanTrack based information exchange was largely done by retailers in 
interaction with the competition authorities. Nonetheless, there was also an impact for 
producers, out of which many had heavily relied on the data. This was visible also amongst 
                                                 
7
 For the purposes of this paper, the Finnish abbreviation PTY for Päivittäistavarakauppa ry shall be used. The 
association‟s official logo also features PTY. Please note that there is also an English abbreviation FGTA.  
8
 ETL is the abbreviation for the Finnish name of the federation: Elintarviketeollisuusliitto. This is also used in 
their English references and so it has been chosen to be used in scope of this study. 
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ETL‟s members. The federation is fairly active in generating statistics of the market and the 
removal of POS data has brought various challenges for them and their member companies.  
 
Finnish Cosmetic, Toiletry and Detergent Association (TY
9
) – Supplier trade association 
The third trusteeship involved in this study, TY, represents the interests of companies 
manufacturing and/or distributing perfumery, cosmetic and toiletry products, detergents, 
cleaning products and similar chemical products. Its 55 member firms represent approximately 
90% of sales on the corresponding market in Finland. The trade association aims to build a 
favorable operational environment for its member companies through several courses of action. 
First, TY follows legislative issues and contributes to their preparation; second, they follow the 
developments of the industry both on national level and European scale; third, they gather sales 
statistics. 
 
The statistics that TY provides have not altered radically since the ending of ScanTrack; 
however their importance is more significant. TY‟s statistics are based on the net sales to 
retailers, which is data collected from TY‟s member firms. Their statistics were hence not 
interlinked with ScanTrack information that is based on consumer sales data.  
 
Haribo Lakrids Oy – Supplier  
Originating from Germany in the 1920‟s, Haribo is to this date a family-run confectionary 
company. Haribo is operating internationally with a strong focus on the European region. Since 
1992 it has had a subsidiary in Finland with 13 employees. The three main product sectors are 
Fruit gums, Liquorice and foam based sweets and they are marketed under the two core brands 
Haribo and Maoam. 
 
Being the fourth largest confectionary producer in Finland, Haribo Lakrids (later referred to as 
Haribo) faces several challenges associated to being the runner up. Despite their relatively 
small size on the Finnish market, they purchased ScanTrack information. Now left without it 
they are finding new ways to operate both internally and with regards to their customers –the 
retail trade and wholesale companies.  
 
 
                                                 
9
 TY stands for Teknokemian yhdistys ry and the abbreviation is used also in English context. Thus TY will be 
used as the abbreviation for the association within this paper. 
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Mars Finland Oy – Supplier 
Mars is one of the world‟s largest family-owned companies founded in the early 20th century 
in the USA. It is operational in six business segments including Chocolate, Petcare, Wrigley 
Gum and Confections, Food, Drinks and Symbioscience, generating annual revenues of $30 
billion. It is in leading position globally for confectionary and pet care. Mars Finland operates 
in Finland and the Baltics employing over 80 people and offering 11 brands ranging from food 
and snack food to pet care. Mars Finland (including the Baltics) had an annual turnover target 
of approximately €100 million in 2008.  
 
The termination of POS data distribution through ScanTrack affected Mars Finland (later 
referred to as Mars). They had previously used the information quite extensively and now seek 
to find new solutions for collecting and analyzing data. The company is in close interaction 
with the retailers and their wholesalers to retrieve data. Furthermore, they are currently placing 
more emphasis on in-house data analysis.  
 
Unilever Finland Oy – Supplier 
Unilever is a global provider of home, personal care and food products with over 400 brands 
and a turnover of €40,5 billion in 2008. They are market leaders in all the Food categories in 
which they operate (Savoury and Dressings, Spreads, Weight Management, Tea, and Ice 
Cream) as well as Skin and Deodorants from the Home and Personal care categories. Unilever 
operates in around 100 countries and employs 174 000 people worldwide. Unilever is dual-
listed company of Dutch-British origin. In Finland the firm has 140 employees and a turnover 
of €218 million in 2008.  
 
Like most of the suppliers, Unilever learned about the ending of ScanTrack on very short 
notice. A lot of speculation arose on the supplier field as to how this transformation may in fact 
affect the entire industry and even internal processes and resource allocation in companies. 
Unilever was the first company interviewed for this study in spring 2008 – one year before the 
main round of interviews. They gave valuable input on the initial reactions just days after data 
receiving from ScanTrack ended in practice. A follow-up interview with the company 1,5 years 
later gave answers to whether the suppliers‟ initial concerns had been met.  
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Kesko Food Ltd – Retail trader 
Kesko Food Ltd (later referred to as Kesko) is a Finnish-based grocery trader with a network of 
over 1000 K-food stores in Finland. The Kesko conglomerate‟s total turnover in 2009 
amounted to almost €8,5 billion from various operations including grocery trade, interior 
design, DIY, agricultural supplies and machinery, consumer durables, and car sales. The 
company had a 33,5% market share in the food trade business in 2006, which was the crucial 
year in the ScanTrack case. This places Kesko Food as the second largest grocery trade 
company in Finland.  
 
Kesko had a central role in the events linked to ScanTrack. Firstly, it was barcode information 
from their stores that contributed to the data. Moreover, with S Group they contacted the 
Finnish Competition Authority to make an inquiry on whether the ScanTrack information 
exchange raised concerns for competition regulation.  
 
S Group (part of SOK) – Retail trader 
Finland‟s leading retailing cooperative S Group is active in a range of businesses including 
grocery trade, consumer durables, hotels, restaurants, service stations, agricultural supplies, 
service stations and car sales. The total revenue of SOK amounted to 10,5 billion in 2007. In 
2006 their market share in the Finnish food trade business was 39,9%, which places them as 
the largest company in the sector.  
 
S Group provided point-of-sales data for ScanTrack purposes and was also in a central role in 
the ending of the system. Like mentioned earlier, they contacted the Finnish Competition 
Authority together with Kesko and were in constant interaction during the analysis of the 
situation.  
 
Inex Partners Oy (part of SOK) – Logistics & sourcing company 
Operating as the sourcing and logistics company, Inex Partners caters to the needs of the S-
Group‟s grocery and consumer goods trade, as well as their customer-oriented development. 
For key figures please refer to above (S Group).  
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To sum it up, the table below summarizes the stakeholders that were as well as the persons 
from each company or association. A broader listing including the dates of the interviews is 
located in appendix 1.  
 
Table 1. Interview listing 
 
 
3.2 QUALITATIVE INTERVIEW METHOD 
A qualitative interview approach is crucial for in-depth analysis of the topic. It gives managers 
and industry experts the opportunity to elaborate on the issue, take various perspectives and 
even discuss future paths of action. Qualitative methodology is also natural since the issue has 
not been earlier clearly defined or mapped, in which case quantitative methodology may have 
been an option. In order to build a comprehensive understanding of the marketing channel and 
the communication between the actors it is necessary to enable open descriptions. The typically 
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quantitative way of setting predefined frames for answers and limited answer alternatives does 
not permit depicting the situation in accuracy. Hence, the research material is gathered through 
qualitative theme interviews with several managers and industry experts.  
 
Bryman (2004) identifies different types of interviews, including structured, semi-structured 
and unstructured interviews. Structured interviews – sometimes also called standardized 
interviews – have the exact same content of questioning for each interview. It is important that 
the results can be standardized and aggregated for comparison. In these types of interviews rich 
and detailed answers are seem more as a nuisance since they are harder to process and „code‟ 
(Bryman 2004). Semi-structured interviews follow a more lenient structure and the interviewer 
often uses an „interview guide‟ that has a list of questions or topics for discussion. Yet there is 
a lot of leeway as to the order in which these questions are asked. Typically the questions 
should be phrased similarly to give the interviewees the same cues; however the interview does 
not need to be restricted to the pre-prepared questions. The interviewer can and even should 
pick up topics that pop up and ask more about these. An even more extreme example of 
flexible interviewing is unstructured interviews. Here the researcher brings along a brief set of 
prompts for him- or herself to remember the key points for discussion. It can also be that only 
one single question is asked and then the rest relies on the follow-up of what the interviewee 
brings up. Noteworthy is that only the semi-structured and unstructured interview methods are 
categorized as qualitative interviewing (Bryman 2004). 
 
The research at hand relies on semi-structured interviews and the usage of predefined 
questions. However, questions are not restricted to these and also ad-hoc questions that emerge 
during the interviews are asked. A challenge and extra workload for the study is that the same 
questions are not possible to be used in multiple interviews. First of all, the interviewed 
companies represent different levels of the value chain and hence their relationship to the 
information exchange of sales data takes on vastly different roles (information source / 
purchaser of information / third party etc.). The interview needs to start from their standpoint, 
which is fundamentally different than that of another stakeholder. Moreover, trade associations 
and the Finnish Competition Authority naturally all have their distinctive role. Due to these 
reasons the questions cannot have a unified form. However, all interviews follow a common 
frame and agenda flow that is chronological. After introductory comments and initial questions 
on the role of the interviewee, the discussion turns to the past. All interviews included 
discussion of what kind of a system ScanTrack was perceived to be and what type of a role it 
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had for the company. After discussing the earlier situation, focus is drawn to the current state 
after ScanTrack and lastly to the future prospects that the interviewees envisage or hope for. 
The chronological setting is a baseline in the interviews and is also reflected into this report. 
The empirical part of this study is structured in a chronological manner.  
 
Kvale (1996) discusses the phrasing of questions and identifies nine different types of 
interview questions. Most interviews are likely to contain all of them. The following shows 
Kvale‟s categorisation and gives examples of each type of question from the actual interviews 
that are conducted in frames of this research.  
1. Introducing questions: “How was your job related to ScanTrack information 
exchange?” 
2.  Follow-up questions: encourage the interviewee to elaborate on his/her answer, “What 
do you mean when you say that the information was very detailed?” 
3.  Probing questions: Follow up on what has been said through direct questioning, “Could 
you elaborate on this aspect?” 
4.   Specifying questions: ask for more details on a specific point, “When did this change 
take place?” 
5.    Direct questions: “Are you and your company content with the current situation?” 
6.   Indirect questions: “Many suppliers used ScanTrack information; do you think they 
have been affected by this change?” 
7.    Structuring questions: “Let us now move on to discuss the current situation.” 
8.   Silence: Interestingly Kvale (1996) defines „silence‟ as a type of question. By pausing 
the interviewer signals that he or she is interested in hearing more and wants to give 
the interviewee a chance to reflect. 
9.   Interpreting questions: clarify and extent the meanings of interviewees‟ statements 
without posing meaning on them, “If I understand correctly, you feel that the lack of 
this type of information is a major challenge?” 
 
The findings of Kvale (1996) are also supported by Patton (1990). He discusses probes in more 
detail. According to Patton (1990, 238; see also Maykut & Morehouse 1994) a probe is “an 
interview tool used to go deeper into the interview responses”. An interviewee‟s response is 
probed to gain a better understanding of phenomenon with either detail-oriented, elaboration or 
clarification probes. The three types of probes play an important part in the interviews as 
elaborated below. According to Patton detail-oriented probes are designed to fill out the 
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picture with questions such as “how did this change affect your work?” or “when did this take 
place?”. Elaboration probes on the other hand aim to encourage the interviewee to talk further 
about the topic. These types of probes can be mere voicing such as „uh-huh‟ or non-verbal 
showing of attentive listening. Elaboration probes also involve verbal encouragement, such as 
“could you please talk more about that”. The third type of probes, clarification probes, is often 
made of necessity. Something is unclear to the interviewer or he or she would like something 
to be repeated. It could for instance be that a specific issue has been briefly mentioned and the 
interviewer wants to make sure he or she has understood the meaning behind the words in 
order to avoid any potential misunderstandings. Probing for clarification is often in the form of 
questions, such as “I want to make sure I understand what you mean. Could you please 
describe it for me again?”.  
 
The importance of the probes –especially detail-oriented and elaboration probes – is clear due 
to several reasons. Firstly, none of the interviewees are given the interview questions 
beforehand. On one occasion this was requested and the interviewee was sent several of the 
broader questions to give an idea of the themes for the interview. Hence, the interviewees are 
not aware of the entire palette of questions and the detail-oriented probes of which some are 
included in the interview manuscript. Secondly, probes are used since the interviews are semi-
structured and the questions laid down before-hand were not followed in a rigorous manner. 
Topics brought up by the interviewee are discussed flexibly. As can be expected, the answers 
to opening questions show the way for those to follow. Also, the reluctance or special 
willingness to discuss sensitive issues has an effect on the flow of the interview. Moreover, the 
interviewees are first asked a question as broadly as possible to give them space for thought. 
Then as the topic is discussed, probes are used to give more direction to the conversation. 
Special attention is given to the formulation of the questions: questions are phrased so that they 
do not push the answerer towards a specific type of answer. This is supported by Bryman 
(2004), who highlights that questions should not be leading or imply a specific reply. Such a 
question would be for instance “Would you not agree that ScanTrack data had a strong 
influence on your pricing decisions?”.  
 
This brings us to open-ended questions that are a basis for the discussions (Maykut & 
Morehouse 1994). An initial question might be for instance: “What do you think this issue is 
influenced by?” rather than “Do you think x or y influences this issue?”. If the interviewee is 
struggling to find answers, the first question might be followed by a probe, such as “Do you 
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feel that this was influenced by something inside or outside the company?”, which still leaves 
lots of room for thought as to the influencers. However, if the interviewee has until then 
focused on influencers inside the company, a follow-up question might be used to direct them 
to a new perspective: “Do you think issues outside the company influence this?”. As a whole, 
open-ended questions and probing enabled a reliable outcome since many of the issues initially 
pin-pointed in the discussion are done by the interviewee, not the interviewer. In the study it is 
taken into consideration whether something was mentioned up-front or only after probing. The 
focus of an interviewee on a specific area, such as issues inside the company, is of course a 
relevant part of the analysis – regardless of whether they are specifically asked to also talk 
about influencers outside the company. Charmaz (2002) supports the idea of starting with 
open-ended questions before moving into what she defines as „intermediate questions‟. 
According to her distinction open-ended questions seem to be broader, whereas intermediate 
questions often follow-up on previously discussed issues and are perhaps more focused on the 
specific matters that the interviewer is interested in.  
 
To conclude, a lot of attention is placed on formulating the questions during the interviews. 
Each question is formulated so that it makes as few assumptions as possible and allows lots of 
possibilities for thought. More targeted questions are only made after initial thoughts have been 
given space. The semi-structured nature of the interviews also allows for reactive questions 
based on the interviewees output and interests.  
 
3.3 RELIABILITY OF THE STUDY 
Reliability as a concept may be identified as “dependability, stability, consistency, 
predictability, accuracy” (Kerlinger 1973, 422). These are all important factors and apply to the 
analysis of reliability in diverse situations. However, the reliability of qualitative research is 
best analysed by measures especially developed for it. Well applicable parameters have been 
established by Lincoln and Guba (1985), who point out the following four key issues in 
analysing the trustworthiness of research.  
(1) Truth value 
(2) Applicability 
(3) Consistency 
(4) Neutrality 
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The first aspect, truth value, hits on the note of credibility. A study should be carried out so 
that the findings can be expected to be credible and that they are so at the end. The basic 
constructions of a research are often influencers to the truth value. Concerning this study one 
key issue that can be analysed is the time frame. The interviews were spread out over a time 
frame of about half a year from May 2009 to December 2009. At this point a few years had 
passed since alterations on the ScanTrack system in Finland and AC Nielsen‟s services had 
started taking place. It was around one year after the final decision by the Finnish Competition 
Authorities in June 2008 to determine the anti-competitive. Therefore enough time has passed 
for the reactions of stakeholders to have taken place and it was worth evaluating for instance 
changes in the power relations of the different actors. On the other hand it is an optimal time to 
analyse the situation, since not too long has past.  
 
Noteworthy is that a few interviews were also conducted outside this before mentioned time 
frame. One interview with a supplier (Unilever) was carried out during spring 2008 in the 
immediate weeks that followed the news that ScanTrack might come to an end in Finland. This 
interview gave an important window to the sudden impact that this decision had and the 
questions and dilemmas that emerged. It also served as a basis for building the study and the 
remaining interviews. The broad interview period enables a longer-term glance at the situation 
and the analysis of the evolvement of the situation from the first weeks and months after the 
system was put down to the situation a few years later. The last interview was carried out in 
January 2010 with the trade association TY.  
 
This type of prolonged engagement (Freeman 1983) is valuable since it gives insight on a 
broader time frame and also helps spot potential misinformation that may be overlooked with a 
more hurried approach. At the time of the interviews, the stakeholders were in the midst of 
strong alterations in the industry. The accustomed ways of sharing information had come to an 
end and there seemed to be a strong sense of anticipation. Various parties were involved in 
discussions on substitutive ways to share market information. Due to the evolving and sensitive 
situation some parties were reluctant to discuss their negotiations and future plans in exact 
detail. However, interviews with the stakeholders did enable deeper analysis of the information 
exchange in the consumer goods retail sector in Finland. Separate interviews were in line with 
each other, which supported the reliability of the received information.  
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The second issue suggested for evaluation by Lincoln and Guba (1985) is applicability: 
whether the findings of the study would be applicable to other contexts or other respondents. 
The research was carried out specific to the circumstances and companies present. The Finnish 
retail market situation is very unique –like markets mostly are – and therefore caution should 
be used to generalize the results to other industries or geographical markets. Not all markets are 
for instance so highly concentrated, which has a fairly broad impact. Yet, as Kaplan (1964) 
points out, generalization should to some extent be applicable free of time and context. The 
idea of replicating a framework is supported also by other scholars (see for instance Ford 
1975). With this study the identified factors influencing information exchange, which are 
presented in the framework of 2.4 are likely to be transferable. Like indicated later in this 
paper, the value and emphasis of each one (framework 4.5) needs further research regarding its 
transferability.  
 
A third aspect for analysing a study‟s trustworthiness is consistency. This evaluates whether 
the research findings would be repeated if the study was replicated with the same or similar 
context and respondents. The study aimed to build an industry-wide perspective by including 
different stakeholders and hence the scope goes beyond a dual relationship between two 
companies. However, only a limited amount of companies operating in the industry could be 
involved. Noteworthy is that on the retailer side the percentage share of companies involved 
rises quite high due to having only a hand-full of grocery traders on the market. To sum up, it 
is most probable that the finding would be repeated if the same respondents were included in a 
future study. If different companies (similar respondents) were involved from the same context 
(the Finnish retail industry), some nuances could be expected to emerge. However, to a large 
extent the views are likely to be similar. This consistency is increased by the involvement of 
trade associations. They represent a broad arena of companies and hence bring some additional 
generalizability.  
 
Lastly, the final issue to lift up is neutrality. It is critical that the findings are determined by the 
respondents and conditions. It should not be influenced by the biases, motivations, interests or 
perspectives of the inquirer. A key issue is the objectivity of the researcher (see also Scriven 
1971). This study is conducted as part of the KAULIN research initiative, which is a neutral 
university-based initiative. Although some companies interviewed are partners of KAULIN, 
they had no direct impact on how the research was carried out. Moreover, they were in fact 
chosen for this research primarily for other reasons than affiliation to KAULIN. Last of all, 
54 
 
neutrality is also strengthened since the researcher has no direct association to any of the 
organisations involved.   
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4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
This section makes the shift from theoretical discussion to the empirical situation within the 
Finnish consumer goods retail sector. The aim is to analyse the sector in relation to the theories 
and regulation presented earlier. This chapter also gives insight to the evolving nature of 
information exchange that is currently visible on the Finnish retail market and discusses the 
stance of the various stakeholders. The stakeholders that are involved in the empirical part of 
this study represent both the retailer and the supplier sides of the sector as well as institutional 
influencers. 
 
This chapter is begun with a brief description of the situation the industry is facing when 
conducting the research. Radical changes are taking place since the ScanTrack system of AC 
Nielsen was abolished in early 2008. The empirical section then goes forth to analysing 
information exchange on the sector through the lens of academic theory. Section 4.2 elaborates 
on the environment factors and the impact these have on the Finnish retail trade. Part 4.3 
concentrates on the relationship and company internal factors that affect information exchange 
between the stakeholders. It also dwells more deeply into the situation each stakeholder is now 
in and analyses issues such as power relations and market orientation. Moreover, the 
relationship-based and non-relationship based information sources are distinguished. In part 
4.4 a revised framework is introduced to sum up the empirical findings and to illustrate their 
implications on the original theoretical framework in section 2.3. Further analysis and 
discussion follows in chapter 5 of this study. 
 
4.1 INITIAL ANALYSIS 
ScanTrack is a service provided by a company called ACNielsen, who collects Point-of-Sales 
(POS) data from grocery traders. The data is based on bar code (EAN) information that is 
collected at cash registers at the time of purchase. Store-specific data is transferred 
electronically to AC Nielsen where the sales information is weighed to correspond to the sales 
of the base group. The weighing is based on AC Nielsen‟s grocery trade store register. 
ScanTrack measures mainly the markets of a) packed groceries, b) cosmetic, toiletry and 
detergent products and c) household products. The data is very specific and distributed with a 
high frequency. Technically purchases can be tracked down to specific products or purchase 
times. Companies buying the data are able to access weekly updates although many firms opt 
for less frequent packages. POS data portrays the actualised sales of products and gives out 
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historical data that serves primarily to monitor past events. On the short term firms may be able 
to spot the results of campaigns whereas on the long term consumer trends are often visible. 
ScanTrack is useful in monitoring overall market development, conducting competitor 
analysis, managing category selections, making investment decisions and forming pricing 
strategies.
 10
 
 
In Finland, the POS data came from the grocery traders, including the two largest companies 
Food Kesko and S-Group. The third largest company (Suomen Lähikauppa Oy) and several 
discount chains were also part of it. An exception that is well known on the market is Lidl with 
an approximately 4 percent market share – they did not provide or receive POS information. 
Retailers and producers both benefited from the information provided by the ScanTrack 
system. The data was very comprehensive and therefore provided a detailed picture of the 
overall market. The retailers had the opportunity to see how they were doing in comparison to 
their competitors. The same applied to suppliers who could examine their market shares and 
growth in comparison to other suppliers. ScanTrack information was also geographically 
categorised and could be analysed area by area.  
 
The Finnish Competition Authority (FCA) started analyzing the ScanTrack information 
exchange in the Finnish retail sector after being contacted by the two major retailers, SOK and 
Kesko, in early 2007. The information exchange that was maintained by AC Nielsen was 
acknowledged as potentially competition-hindering. As a result of their investigation, the FCA 
concluded that the practice had been against competition regulation since the two major 
retailers were able to use the information to monitor each other‟s prices. Since Kesko and SOK 
enjoyed a combined market share of over 73 percent, they were able to draw solid conclusions 
on the main competitor‟s pricing by comparing their own prices to the sector‟s average price. 
(Finnish Competition Authority 2008, 154/61/2007, 2 & 11) 
 
The key events in the process leading to the termination of the ScanTrack system are shown in 
the timeline in figure 6. Also, the timeline is continued for 2008-2009, when this research took 
place. 
 
                                                 
10
 Source AC Nielsen homepage: http://fi.nielsen.com/products/rms_scantrack.shtml, accessibility verified 
30.4.2010.  
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Figure 6. ScanTrack Timeline 
 
 
4.2 INFORMATION EXCHANGE IN THE FINNISH RETAIL ENVIRONMENT 
The Finnish retail environment is affected by several major issues that have implications on the 
information exchange on the sector. Prominently, the structure of the industry is very 
concentrated, which leads to special firm dynamics. It has also drawn attention from external 
regulators. By analysing the channel structure it is possible to better understand the framing on 
which the interactions are built. This section will elaborate of the aforementioned topics.  
 
4.2.1 Market Concentration and Dynamics 
For the market, the final FCA decision came as no surprise as the firms had by then 
accustomed to the past events and embraced themselves for the anticipated future events. 
However, in the beginning reactions were very different. ScanTrack service provider AC 
Nielsen had a strong belief that the system brought no adverse effects
11
. According to the firm 
the system was to the benefit of the consumer and was not competition-hindering. On the 
                                                 
11
News article in Markkinointi ja Mainonta magazine 18.10.2007 http://www.marmai.fi/uutiset/article66584.ece, 
Accessibility verified as of 30.4.2010.  
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contrary, it increased information and transparency to promote competition. This is an 
interesting claim, however in light of previous research too much transparency may be of harm 
in certain market conditions (Georgantzís & Sabater-Grande 2002, Bloomfield & O‟Hara 1999, 
Overgaard & Møllgaard 2005). Negative implications arise especially in highly concentrated 
markets, which apply very well to the Finnish situation. AC Nielsen builds a reference to the 
over one hundred countries where they are operating the service with no problems. According 
the competition authorities there may well exist infringement of regulation also in other 
countries, but the authorities have just not yet dealt with it.  
 
It is interesting to analyse whether there were attempts by the stakeholders to shape the Finnish 
Competition Authority‟s decision (Hillman et al. 2004, Shaffer 1995). For instance for 
suppliers not much could be done as the cash register information was withheld by the retailers 
and the FCA‟s decision was anticipated. From FCA‟s perspective the lobbying initiatives from 
the stakeholders were probably quite restricted and limited in their influence. During the 
process, the FCA actively interacted with the retailers and AC Nielsen. For the latter, a 
„negative‟ decision could understandably be seen as very detrimental. A major part of their 
business in Finland was based on the ScanTrack service. The retailers, on the other hand, were 
the ones that had initiated the investigation and especially Kesko was very proactive in 
withdrawing themselves from ScanTrack. It is unlikely that this kind of behaviour was 
accompanied by persuasion towards the FCA. Shaffer (1995) analyses firm-level responses to 
government regulation and concludes that these include strategic adaptation and attempts to 
influence public policy. One could argue – like some of the stakeholders have – that the retailer 
initiative to contact the FCA was in fact driven by a change in strategy. Whether or not this 
claim can stand light, it is clear that the retailers, especially Kesko, were actively implementing 
a new strategy in their information gathering, processing and sharing already before the final 
decision from the FCA came in June 2008.  
 
The implications of the isomorphism concept (DiMaggio & Powell 1983, Scott 1995a, 
Srikantia 1997) find support from this study. Following the termination of ScanTrack, firms are 
no longer able to base their processes on the data they had taken for granted. Some firms had 
embraced the common norm of purchasing ScanTrack data although it was not optimal for 
them (Morgan 1986). Retailers on the other hand had carried out information sharing that is 
typical in most other markets. Less consideration had been given to special market situation 
Finnish retail was in. These types of actions bring homogeneity and are classic ways for firms 
59 
 
according to isomorphic theory. Next, focus is shifted to the regulatory environment 
surrounding affecting information exchange.   
 
It is evident that the Finnish retail sector is surrounded by an increasingly strong and 
influencing institutional environment. Due to the high market concentration of S Group and 
Kesko the normative or uncertainty-based pressures may have been fairly meek in the past. 
However during the past few years the focus has turned to information exchange and pressure 
to act according to a common norm has grown stronger. This kind of isomorphism has been 
enforced especially through new control mechanisms. The Finnish Competition Authority has 
taken its stance towards the processing and forwarding of up-to-date cash register data. Hence 
the „legislative‟ isomorphic pressure discussed by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) has intensified. 
According to Galaskiewicz and Zaheer (1999), tie modality presents the institutionalized rules 
and norms of behaviour –either as formal contracts or mutual understandings within the dyad 
or network. If these ties are strong the likelihood for oligopolistic coordination is higher. In 
other words, strong ties in a network allow for greater collusion. Naturally the nature of the 
relationship plays an important role, whether it is collaborative or rivalrous. In the Finnish 
retail context the relationship between Kesko and SOK as well as other retailers is highly 
rivalrous. Therefore it is unlikely that planned collusion would take place as the companies are 
very careful not to have any convivial conversations with each other.   
 
4.2.2 Channel Environment 
In section 2.1.2 the concept of environmental pluralism of channel dyads was introduced. It can 
be stated that members of a commercial channel, such as a manufacturer and a retailer, have a 
dyadic link if there is goal-oriented social interaction (Achrol et al. 1983) between them. What 
is then interesting is to look at whether the links are direct or indirect dependencies to identify 
the primary and secondary task environments and the macro environment of the dyad. 
Furthermore, as explained earlier, it is in most cases possible to structure the relationship 
between the actors by describing the economic structure and processes as well as the political 
structure and processes. (Stern & Reve 1980; Achrol et al. 1983) 
 
Achrol et al. (1983, 59) highlight that it is crucial to distinguish the level in the chain of 
distribution that is taken as a focus for the study. In other words it is necessary to identify a 
channel dyad to be used as a focal dyad when applying the „Environment of Marketing 
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Channel Dyads‟ framework. The authors list manufacturer-retailer as one of the archetype 
focal dyad. Therefore, to dimensionalize the Finnish consumer goods retail sector it is 
necessary to identify a dyad relationship that has transactions involving information exchange. 
The relationship between a manufacturer/supplier and a retailer fulfils this prerequisite 
(Iacobucci & Hopkins 1992). Examples of companies that have the role of a 
manufacturer/supplier in this study are Unilever, Haribo and Mars. Accordingly Kesko and 
SOK can be identified as retailers and are indeed the two major ones with a combined market 
share of over 73 percent (Finnish Competition Authorities 2008, 154/61/2007). Having 
identified the focal dyad as a supplier and a retailer, it is now possible to analyse the 
environment of the dyad as well as the relationships between the actors.    
 
The internal political economy framework of Achrol et al. (1983) goes forth by discussing 
interactions in the primary task environment. By definition, actors in this environment have 
transactions and direct contact with the focal dyad or one of the focal dyads. As originally 
illustrated in the figure 2, regulatory agents and competitors are located on the border line of 
the primary task environment. This raises the question, whether these actors in the Finnish 
consumer goods retail sector can be included in the primary task environment. It is worth first 
analysing the position of regulatory agents. In the given situation the main agent acting with 
regulatory power on information exchange in the sector is the Finnish Competition Authority 
(FCA). They have been in direct contact and interaction with retailers, such as Kesko and SOK. 
These transactions mainly include information exchange, both in oral and written form. This is 
brought up by the FCA representatives and is evident also from their Diary 154/61/2007. If 
FCA is merely a regulator with no direct interaction with the focal dyad it would be in their 
secondary task environment. However, in this specific situation the FCA is clearly in their 
primary task environment. 
 
Moving on, the second interesting situation in identifying the task environments arises 
regarding competitors. Has there been organisational exchange such as information exchange, 
influence, goodwill or social legitimacy between competitors (Scott 1995a; DiMaggio & 
Powell 1983)? The ScanTrack exchange between the retailers did not require direct interaction 
between the companies; rather it was carried out through a third party. Thereafter even this 
shared data has been eliminated. On the highly concentrated retailer market direct interaction is 
probably very scarce. Acting otherwise could raise suspicions of cartels and hence the 
company members are very careful of whether they even say they know someone from the 
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competing company. The comment below portrays the carefulness very explicitly; retailers do 
not want to be associated to one another not to give any false impressions:  
 
“Yes, I know the person. I mean I know of them. We‟re not really supposed to know each 
other”                           – Retailer representative – 
 
 
In the Finnish retail sector there are several prominent trade associations which enable contact 
between the retailers and the suppliers. Achrol et al. (1983) do not include trade associations in 
their initial framework. In fact the four-faced split between input environment, output 
environment, regulatory environment and competitive environment does not clearly allow for 
trade associations. Moreover, all other partner firms or third party service providers have been 
excluded from the model. It is likely that Achrol et al. (1983) have aimed to construct a 
simplified model, however trade associations seem to play and important role. One option 
would be to elaborate the “regulatory environment” to include also other influencer, such as 
trade associations. Naturally this does not fully portray the multitude of interaction between the 
dyad members and the trade associations, yet it would ensure the recognition of their existence.  
 
The Finnish Grocery Trade Association (PTY) has all the largest retailers on its member list. 
Likewise, the Finnish Food and Drink Industries‟ Federation (ETL) has a broad member list, 
including for instance all the industrial companies that took part in this study. The Finnish 
Cosmetic, Toiletry and Detergent Association (TY) is also an important actor on the market 
although its relevance on information gathering and exchange is slightly lower than that of 
ETL. The trade associations allow for horizontal interaction. As an example, industry 
representatives within the ETL have discussed their reactions to the changes in the information 
exchange situation. It is probable that the interaction between the actors is limited to meetings 
under these associations and does not include direct company-to-company interaction outside 
the spectrum of ETL, TY or PTY. On the retailer side, all discussions carried out at PTY focus 
on common industry issues, such as the regulation of opening hours. Topics related to the 
performance of the companies are not brought up. In conclusion, competitors are not in 
transactional relationships with each other and hence they are part of the secondary task 
environment as suggested by Achrol (1983).  
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In addition to horizontal transactions within the sector there is also strong vertical interaction 
between retailers and suppliers. This is enabled by a third instance, ECR (Efficient Consumer 
Response) Finland. ECR Finland forms an important arena for communication between the 
member companies of both PTY and ETL, in other words the retailers and suppliers. ECR 
interacts mainly with the above mentioned trade associations and is hence in many situations 
not in direct contact with the suppliers and retailers. It is interesting to analyse how ECR 
Finland is located in the task environments. It is clear that they have direct contact with 
members of the focal dyad, such as communication and influence. Therefore ECR Finland can 
be examined as part of the primary task environment.   
 
A closer look can now be taken at the structure of the network of internal and external actors of 
the dyad. Like presented in section 2.1.2, there are four dimensions to analysing the 
relationships between channel members (Achrol et al. 1983; Granovetter 1985). These are the 
following: 
(a) Economic structure  
(b) Economic processes  
(c) Political structure  
(d) Political processes  
 
An information exchange perspective shall be taken to the analysis of these elements. The 
economic structure refers to market and hierarchical transactions between the channel 
members. In the Finnish retail context, ScanTrack information exchange was taking place both 
on a horizontal and on a vertical level between the actors. In the current situation no horizontal 
exchange occurs between the retailers. The economic processes are the decision-making 
mechanisms of the industry. These are largely driven by the retailers due to their strong 
position in the economic structure. In general common level decisions are also taken within the 
trade associations. Earlier ECR Finland has had a stronger role in the economic processes; 
however now their influence is diminishing as fewer companies see value in open 
communication of their best practices. Third, the political structure, in other words the power 
relations, is an influencer to the channel relationships. The issue is whether power is minimal, 
balanced, imbalanced or centralized. In the Finnish retail context power is highly imbalanced 
towards the retailers and also centralized, since an oligopoly exists on the retailer market. 
Lastly, the political processes of the sector are both cooperative and conflictive. The 
termination of ScanTrack most likely brought some tension the events and interaction 
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immediately. However, suppliers are so heavily reliant on data provided by retailers that they 
have little choice but to stay in close cooperative contact.  
 
4.2.3 External Regulation 
To underline the variance of the occurring information exchange events it is critical to 
distinguish between vertical and horizontal information exchange. Figure 7 is a simplified 
visualisation of supplier and retailer interaction and information exchange. It shows that there 
is exchange between the different levels of the value chain as well as within a single level. 
Exchange between stakeholders at different levels is referred to as vertical information 
exchange (type „b‟ in the figure below) and interaction between competitive companies, such 
as suppliers, is termed horizontal information exchange (types „a‟ and „c‟ below).  
 
Figure 7. Vertical and Horizontal Information Exchange 
 
One form of information exchange previously on the market was the ScanTrack system. 
Noteworthy is that in most other countries the service is still operational. ScanTrack as a 
service is very all-inclusive: it encompasses retailers as well as suppliers. An interesting aspect 
of it is that it is not based on a B-to-B relationship between two companies, but is instead open 
to practically all parties on the market that have the interest and resources to purchase the data. 
From this perspective all information that is exchanged between companies can be divided into 
two different categories: private and public information. In the figure below the arrows 
represent both private and public information exchange. 
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ScanTrack –based exchange occurs on the public level in both vertical and horizontal 
relationships. Since the data originates from retailers, the potential horizontal public exchange 
takes place among them and not on the supplier side. If we restrict public information to 
ScanTrack, it is fair to say that the suppliers receive this information only from their 
downstream value chain, in other words the retailers and not each other. In order for the 
exchange to be public it often requires a third party to collect and process the data. Due to 
competition regulation this may even be essential to avoid competitors from getting direct data 
from one another. In the case of ScanTrack the service was provided by AC Nielsen, who 
collected and analysed the data originating from the retailers. In horizontal information 
exchange it has been regulated that companies should not be able to link data to specific 
competitors. This means that the data needs to be aggregated and coming from a sufficient 
amount of companies so that one of them cannot be spotted from the figures. A third party 
often combines the data so that the individual companies are not confronted with one another‟s 
information. This is something that is emphasised for instance by ETL, the trade association 
representing the suppliers. Maija Peltola and Heli Tammivuori underline that when gathering 
horizontal information within a sector it is best that a third party is involved.  
 
In addition to public information exchange including ScanTrack, the arrows in the figure 7 also 
portray private communication. Private information is exchanged between two companies in a 
B-to-B relationship. By definition, other companies do not have access to it. The two-way 
arrows symbolize the interaction and reciprocal information exchange that takes place in 
dyadic relationships. As a system ScanTrack was more one-sided: retailers provided input and 
suppliers were only on the output end. In contrast, all personal corporate relationships are more 
mutual and also the suppliers have valuable input for the retailers. This is an important aspect 
especially now as the information exchange focus is shifting more towards private information 
sharing. 
 
The Finnish Competition Authority‟s investigation of the ScanTrack information exchange was 
clearly focused on the horizontal exchange between retailers (type „c‟ in figure 7). As 
mentioned by Director Kirsi Laine, their investigation did not cover the usage of the 
information by the suppliers (a result of exchange „b‟). Whether or not the information was 
potentially competition-hindering also on this level remains unstudied. Laine concludes that if 
the studies had continued further, more emphasis might have been put on this issue. However, 
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since the system was brought down it was no longer necessary to continue further analysis and 
the case was closed.  
 
The ScanTrack system enabled a very critical regulation infringing practice: The two largest 
firms have a dominating market share; they were able to deduct their own prices from the 
aggregated industry price average and thereafter identify each other‟s prices. This meant that 
both knew how their main competitor was pricing the same products. The theoretical 
possibility for this practice was sufficient for the FCA to require a close down of the system. 
This type of an approach is in fact in slight contradiction with recent scholar suggestions (Kühn 
2001). During the interviews the feedback from the retail traders was inconsistent – also within 
a company. Some were very explicit in indicating that the prices were not a point of interest for 
them, whilst others pointed out that the system was used as a tool in making pricing decisions. 
Interestingly, at least one interviewee ended up claiming both stances during the course of the 
interview. It was clearly a subject that the retailers were very cautious of. Yet, some were more 
frank about it and clearly indicated the usage of the data for price analysis in a similar way to 
the following quote: 
 
“Our category and product managers surely knew how to place prices based on the data we 
received through ScanTrack.”                     – Retailer representative –  
 
The comment above indicates the benefit the system brought to price decision-making; whether 
then the competitor prices were drawn from the aggregated data is a different question. It has 
caused a lot of speculation whether or not the retail traders actually did this. There is always 
the option that they merely compared their prices to the average like the data was meant to be 
used. However, it is worth remembering that it was these two companies, Kesko and SOK, 
which initially informed the FCA of the possibility for this practice. During an interview a 
Kesko representative discussed that highly detailed information was possible to be drawn from 
ScanTrack. Although the data was collected by an objective third party, AC Nielsen, it was 
“too easy to get to a too detailed level” to analyse data, especially the prices of each item. 
According to the interviewee this was no longer for the benefit of all actors. After the closure 
of the system, Kesko has also taken the same stance in public, where they have expressed their 
view that competitor actions and plans were too easy to monitor through ScanTrack.
12
 
                                                 
12
 Markkinointi ja Mainonta (a Finnish marketing and advertising magazine) 
http://www.marmai.fi/uutiset/article67018.ece, accessibility verified as of 30.3.2010.  
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Next, the focus shall be shifted to the aspects that made the system competition hindering. Tom 
Björkroth – who was part of the FCA investigation – highlights that competition policy theory 
cannot be used as the sole basis of formulation of local policy (Björkroth 2008). Competition 
policy formulation should take into account the surrounding market conditions. In the Finnish 
environment an essential aspect making the practice regulation-infringing was in fact the 
availability of a weekly announced average price for each product. According to the 
Competition Regulation Law 4§ and the European Community‟s Founding Treaty Article 81, 
this type of up-to-date and week specific information is forbidden. In addition, the information 
was product specific which enabled precise analysis. According to the regulation, information 
on both sales volumes and the total value of sales cannot be available simultaneously since it 
enables calculation of average prices for the goods sold. In its report the FCA concludes that 
having available just one of these two sets of data would not seem to enable price monitoring 
between the two major retailers like having both volume and value information does. (Finnish 
Competition Authority 2008, 154/61/2007, 11-12) 
 
In ScanTrack, sales information had also been categorized based on the size of the retail stores. 
Out of the four different categories, SOK and Kesko had the strongest presence in the largest 
two: 1000-2499m² and over 2500m² stores. Hence, the competition-adverse impact may have 
been greater in these segments. It is noteworthy that the smallest outlet category (100-399 m²) 
did not have a duopolistic structure and therefore it was not possible for the retailers to make 
estimations on competitor‟s prices based on a given average price. The information provided 
by AC Nielsen was also geographically categorized. What has been said earlier regarding 
nationwide data and its potential harmful use also applies to regional data since the regional 
market shares of the companies correlate with the total national market shares. In addition, the 
FCA noticed that the changes in average prices in the regions and those in the entire national 
market also correlated. (Finnish Competition Authority 2008, 154/61/2007, 2 & 12-13) 
 
It is worth examining the details of the Competition Regulation Law 4§ and the European 
Community‟s Founding Treaty Article 81 that have been mentioned above. Both contain 
identical phrasing (see section 2.1.4) of what type of interaction is allowed between the 
different stakeholders in an industry. According to these articles the competition authorities do 
not need to prove that a practice is illegal, instead it is enough to justify that it has been 
potentially harmful in order to ban the practice based on the regulation (Finnish Competition 
Authority 2008, 154/61/2007). Like discussed in the theoretical part of this paper, 
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communication can be either about future plans or past and present actions. Authorities should 
analyse whether this communication has the potential to facilitate coordination or collusion. 
This is in fact the approach the Finnish Competition Authority (FCA) uses in their analysis of 
antitrust cases. FCA‟s Cartel unit‟s Director Kirsi Laine points out that it is sufficient if they 
can state that a specific type of information exchange is prone to restrict competition or 
increase price levels. Nonetheless, FCA does state in its report (Diary 154/61/2007, p. 14) that 
their investigations have shown that “information exchanged in the ScanTrack system has been 
used for instance in pricing decisions and competitor analysis in the daily goods retail trade”. 
The various parties have stated that the information exchange is useful for pricing [and should 
not be terminated], whoever this is exactly why the FCA has had to deal with the matter.  
 
As a second step in evaluating competition-hindering effects of a specific type of information 
exchange, authorities should analyse whether the communication has positive efficiency-
enhancing effects, which are only achievable thanks to the communication (Kühn 2001; see 
also Overgaard & Møllgaard 2005). This is also an issue the FCA takes into consideration in 
their evaluations. The information provided by the ScanTrack system has been used in the 
daily consumer goods trade for pricing and competitor analyses – amongst others. The parties 
involved have claimed that the information brought efficiency benefits in procurement 
negotiations, pricing, product portfolio decisions and logistics. The FCA acknowledges the 
possibility of efficiency benefits, yet it states that the information needed for these types of 
benefits does not require so company specific and detailed information as provided by the 
ScanTrack system. Due to this possibility, the efficiency benefits could not be taken into 
consideration as the efficiency benefits that have been mentioned in the Competition 
Regulation Law 5§ and the European Community‟s Founding Treaty Article 81 (3). (Finnish 
Competition Authority 2008, 154/61/2007) 
 
Table 2 below visualizes the market and information characteristics that impacted FCA‟s 
decision on ScanTrack. Columns one and two are a summary of the different market and 
information factors that could be identified in general. The third column points out what the 
circumstances for each of these characteristics were in the Finnish consumer goods industry 
and in the ScanTrack case. Finally, the last column states the relevance each factor and existing 
situation had on the decision of the FCA when they ruled the ScanTrack information exchange 
is competition-hindering on the Finnish consumer goods industry.  
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Table 2. Relevance of market and information characteristics in FCA’s Decision 
   
Source: Author‟s elaboration based on theoretical discussion and FCA Diary no 154/61/2007. 
 
Table 2 above identifies three market characteristics: retailer market concentration, supplier 
market concentration and coordinated behavior. In general, on the retailer side the market is 
very concentrated in Finland. Three companies amount to 85 percent of the total pie and the 
largest two companies hold a market share of 73 percent. The ScanTrack system potentially 
allowed for tacit coordinated behavior between these companies. These two factors are central 
from the industry structure perspective. The fact that the supplier market was concentrated in 
some product categories was not considered in FCA‟s study and similar coordinated behavior 
may have been possible also on their side.   
 
All in all, as a result of their analysis, the FCA concluded that information exchange between 
the retailers had been potentially competition-hindering and was therefore against antitrust 
regulation. However, since the ScanTrack exchange had already been terminated, no further 
actions were taken. Their analysis and decision focused solely on the information exchange 
between the retailers, not on the information flow from the retailers to the supplier, or on the 
information the suppliers received of one another. How is it then that the entire ScanTrack 
system was brought to a halt? This is an interesting question since it was not a direct 
consequence of FCA‟s actions. In the following sections discuss is focused on the other factors 
that could have caused the termination of the ScanTrack system. 
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4.3 INFORMATION EXCHANGE RELATIONSHIPS IN FINNISH RETAIL 
Thus far we have analysed the environment factors affecting information exchange of the 
Finnish retail sector. This section places focus on the relationship-specific factors as well as the 
companies‟ internal factors, namely the company strategy and goals. We begin this part by 
analysing the public and private market information sources as well as the concept of 
relationship-based information exchange.  
 
4.3.1 Public and Private Information Sources 
Figure 8 below indicates private and public information sources revealed in the interviews. The 
linkage between these information sources and ScanTrack information is also portrayed. As the 
arrows indicate, ScanTrack information was a two-way flow for the retailers, whereas the 
suppliers were only on the receiving end. The lower part of the figure visualises the type of 
information flow from retailer to supplier: the direct sharing of cash register data. In some 
cases this is done through strong IT systems and there may even be a third party service 
provider in between the channel dyad. This type of a service provider is only in interaction 
with one retailer and does not accumulate the data from several as was the case with 
ScanTrack.  
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Figure 8. Dynamics of Attaining and Sharing Market Information 
 
As stated before, information can be categorized into two different types: Public market 
information and company-owned private information. Public information focuses essentially 
on the structure and tools already present on the market for information gathering. It includes 
for instance yearly reports on market shares. Company-owned private information is for 
instance studies that are carried out for specific firms for their internal usage. Despite the 
ending of the ScanTrack system there are numerous options for gathering market information 
in the Finnish retail environment. Interestingly enough, some new forms of market analysis and 
information gathering have been created since the change took place. It has been a motivator 
for third party service providers as well as for individual companies to find new solutions. 
ScanTrack was in many ways a backbone, but businesses did not rely solely on it. Parallel to 
the ScanTrack system, companies used also other information sources, such as import statistics 
or annual sales figures. Once the system ceased to operate, companies have been pushed to find 
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new solutions or to enforce the usage of supplementary methods that were previously used 
side-by-side with ScanTrack.  
 
It is likely that each company has its unique way of searching, receiving and analyzing market 
information and sales data. ScanTrack measured sales to the end consumer on a nationwide 
level throughout the different retail chains and as this type of data is no longer available, some 
suppliers have cooperation or partnerships with retailers thus being able to receive information 
based on the same cash register data. Nevertheless, this information is often only shown for the 
supplier‟s own products and it is clearly specific to only the given retailer –not to the entire 
retail market. This leaves both suppliers and retailers with a less elaborate set of information 
than before.  
 
It is very interesting to analyze the courses of action that companies have taken following the 
ending of ScanTrack. The following introduces some of the information sources that have been 
brought up by the stakeholders in the interviews. They are also visualized in figure 8 in the 
previous section. A majority of the information sources were operational also during 
ScanTrack times, however in some cases their nature and significance has changed. The 
following briefly introduces some of these sources of market information that were mentioned 
during the interviews. 
 
Import statistics 
Import statistics are very useful for some industries and companies. They measure the amount 
of products within a specific product category that have been imported into the country. For 
this data to be useful, the firm naturally needs to be in the import business, not using local 
production or sourcing. In addition, it is vital that all competitors also import their goods. 
Goods also need to be of the same unit of measure to allow for aggregation of data. Once all of 
these prerequisites are fulfilled, the import statistics are a useful source to build understanding 
of the total market. A functioning example is the confectionary business where most of the 
sugared sweets are imported from abroad. Therefore Haribo is a good example of a company 
who benefits from this information. 
 
Market share information  
This source of information was mentioned numerous times during the interviews. AC Nielsen 
provides annual market share information that is based on their store register. When this 
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information comes out in February each year the retailers are able to see whether they have 
strengthened their position on market. Already during the ScanTrack era this was an important 
statistic, however afterwards its significance has increased. ScanTrack provided indication of 
the entire market situation, which now remains a question during the course of the year since 
retailers are only aware of their own situation and progress. This annual indicator is also used 
by organizations other than the retailers. For instance the FCA is interested to follow the 
development of the grocery trade industry. Also the media and public are well aware of the 
developments on this highly concentrated industry as the market share information hits the 
headlines each year.  
 
In-store price studies 
Price study analysis provides product-specific price information, which was a non-acceptable 
element of ScanTrack. However price studies commissioned by individual companies are not 
as extensive as the system that was based on cash register data. Price studies were often carried 
out also during the time of ScanTrack, as was brought up by a retailer representative. They 
discussed the price studies, which have been outsourced to a separate service provider. Price 
analysts observe pricing at competitors‟ stores and provide reports for internal usage. These 
types of in store price studies are conducted manually and not operated through a centralized 
system. Hence they are considered as „normal business intelligence‟, as phrased by Tom 
Björkroth from the FCA. In addition some employees at Kesko, such as product managers, 
conduct price analysis as part of their job. This ensures that the company‟s prices stay in line 
with the market and are competitive.  
 
Consumer panels 
Consumer panels have received a lot of attention since ScanTrack was terminated. Perhaps the 
most known ones are those of ACNielsen and Suomen Lähikauppa Oy. ACNielsen had the 
Homescan as part of their service portfolio also during ScanTrack (however under a different 
name), and now they have shifted more attention to developing it further by significantly 
increasing the sample size and developing the technology. The basic idea is that consumers 
mark down details of all their grocery purchases, whether it is in a large retail outlet or an 
outdoor market.  
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Bonus card customer information 
This source of information is a privilege of the retailers who have issued elaborate bonus 
systems for regular customers. Finnish consumers are accustomed to using bonus cards and 
collecting bonus points when making their grocery shopping. In fact most Finnish households 
have bonus cards of Kesko, SOK and their competitors. With each purchase the bonus card is 
swiped and the content of the consumer‟s shopping basket is registered. In addition to building 
customer commitment, the retailers also receive valuable data on consumers‟ purchase 
behavior and preferences. Based on these they can for instance carry out consumer 
segmentation.  
 
In today‟s global markets, information is more readily available than before. Maltz & Kohli 
(1996) argue that competitive advantage is increasingly dependent on a firm‟s ability to use the 
market intelligence (see also Menon & Varadrajan 1992; Moorman, Zaltman & Deshpande 
1992). Although the Finnish market is very particular in its information dissemination, many 
actors support this finding. Both retailers and suppliers have mentioned during the interviews 
that the information is „out there‟, yet it is now more difficult to bring it together. For instance, 
Mars seems to highlight the compilation and analysis of data as one of their key challenges at 
the moment. Likewise, SOK indicated interest for a third party service that would compile data 
from diverse sources, not only cash registers. The sources of data could be for instance 
statistical reports, European-wide information, consumption figures, advertising information 
and consumer panel results. To sum up, the market is packed with information but this is 
challenging to manage.  
 
4.3.2 Internal Company Strategy 
A key source of information that has not yet been evaluated in relation to the ScanTrack case is 
the direct communication between the suppliers and retailers. Here retrieving information is 
crucially anchored in the relationship and the motivation of both sides. The previously 
operational ScanTrack system involved information sharing through a third party. This meant 
that the suppliers and retailers did not necessarily need to interact with one another. On one 
hand, the retailers gave cash register data to AC Nielsen and received overall market data in 
return. On the other hand, the suppliers bought the same aggregated market information 
straight from AC Nielsen. After the termination of the system the point-of-sales information 
has been in the sole hands of the retailers and they have been in charge of the selective sharing 
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of it. Selectivity has been visible in the activities of both Kesko and SOK. However, it has 
materialized in different ways. SOK is more selective of the level of data that is gives out, but 
less selective to whom it gives this data. Controversially, Kesko gives out more detailed data, 
but is more selective to whom they share it with. This is where the firm strategies are a key 
influencer to their actions. 
 
The strategies of the retailers seem to have clear implications on their information sharing. The 
interaction with their suppliers is governed by what their key focus for development is (Achrol 
& Etzel 2003). This is mirrored to what information they share and with whom as well as what 
information they are interested in receiving. Achrol and Etzel (2003) identify three different 
goal priorities for retailers as introduced in section 2.2.1: Productivity goals, market adaptation 
goals and channel integration goals. Interestingly, the policies of Kesko and SOK follow 
specific goal priorities as discussed below. The following issues have been stated from the 
views of both the retailers and the suppliers.   
 
Kesko has a strong strategic focus on category development and analysis of consumer 
preferences. Based on bonus card customer information, they segment consumers and analysis 
their shopping behaviour. This is what is portrayed also to suppliers. Kesko teams up with 
companies that have the resources and interest to go through with this type of analysis. For 
instance, large international companies often have the willingness to engage in such 
relationships. In addition, these types of companies also possess the sufficient resources to 
analyse market data, such as cash register information provided to them by the retailer. 
International companies also carry out a fairly large amount of in-house studies of consumer 
preferences, market trends and consumption patterns. This type of information is of interest to 
retailers such as Kesko, who often rely on suppliers for additional feedback on the market. It is 
evident that Kesko‟s strategic priorities are in the quest for market adaptation (Achrol & Etzel 
2003).  
 
Kesko representative Minna Kurunsaari discusses the depth of partnership, with which she 
more or less refers to strategic partnership. A determining factor for her is whether the two 
firms have common goals and actions. She estimates that they have around ten companies with 
which they have a very deep level of partnership. The impression is that the choice for such a 
partner is dependent mainly on the company‟s size and volumes as well as the foundations for 
the cooperation. From a starting point, Kesko does not share the same information with all their 
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suppliers. This is evident from the discussions with the suppliers but also from the input given 
by Kesko representatives. The company engages in different levels of information exchange.  
 
Taking a look at the other major retailer on the market, the differences in focus are evident. 
Based on the discussions carried out with SOK as well as their suppliers, the company‟s main 
effort seems to be value chain optimization. The implication this has on information exchange 
is that SOK focuses on distributing and receiving information that aids production planning, 
logistics and transportation (Dahlstrom et al. 1996, Noordewier et al. 1990). The ultimate effect 
is to minimise costs and to optimise the supply chain. The eye is kept on the flow of goods as 
well as on low-cost procurement. In information exchange this translates into information that 
is especially focused on the specific company instead of comparing it to the overall market 
situation. Suppliers receive very limited information on their competitors and their 
development in comparison to the total category development. For SOK the relevant 
information to share appears to be the volume information since this is critical in managing the 
flow of goods. For them there is a clearly lower interest than for Kesko to share detailed 
information on for instance competitor development. Some suppliers feel that the level of data 
submitted to them by SOK is not sufficient to develop their business. The other side to this is 
that SOK is clearly less interested in receiving information from suppliers regarding issues 
other than the flow of goods. According to the interviewed suppliers, the company also 
expresses less interest in common category development. In conclusion, the goal that SOK 
prioritizes is channel integration (Achrol & Etzel 2003).  
 
The interesting aspect in information shared by SOK is their uniform manner to conducting the 
activity. All of their suppliers have access to the same type of data and this is clearly 
communicated to them. Their goal is to be transparent in the nature and the content of the data 
that is shared. From a supplier perspective this has some positive and some negative aspects. 
As a positive side, the suppliers are very grateful to know exactly what data their competitors 
are getting. According to suppliers, the key issue from a competition perspective is that all 
suppliers have the same data, ergo the same readiness to act. At the time of ScanTrack this was 
largely the case (excluding private information exchange between retailers and suppliers). 
Once ScanTrack ceased to provide information, the same balance and equality remained, 
however this time no one had any data. Now SOK is going down the same path with 
transparent and uniform data sharing that is available for all interested suppliers. On the down 
side, the preciseness of the data does not meet all the needs of the suppliers and a deeper 
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engagement with the retailers will most likely yield only little additional value for supporting 
their overall business strategy.   
 
What is more, the interviews with suppliers indicate that retailers are looking for companies 
that have a leading position in the categories in which they are present. From a supplier 
perspective, this is crucial in order to be relevant for the trade and to receive more information. 
In the case of Kesko, a category captain (Desrochers et al. 2003) may be in a position to 
receive a substantial amount of more quantitative data, such as cash register information. In 
addition, the spent time and the level of interaction between the two firms is likely to be higher. 
 
In conclusion, the information sharing patterns of Kesko and SOK both have their benefits. 
Table 3 below illustrates the different focuses of the two companies and the impact these have 
on the information sharing parameters. Kesko is interested in developing their product offering 
and studying consumer needs, whereas SOK concentrates more on optimising the value chain 
and implementing low-cost procurement. These are manifested in their information exchange 
as shown through the three parameters of preciseness, transparency and accessibility. The 
information from Kesko is precise, yet not available to all. With SOK the information is 
available to all; however it is not very detailed to anyone.   
 
Table 3. Impact of Retailer Strategy on Information Sharing 
 
4.3.3 Relationship Dynamics 
When looking at relationships between retailers and suppliers, different factors that affect the 
information exchange have been identified. Frazier (2009) recognised the following issues 
within the dual relationship: dependence asymmetry, interdependence magnitude, trust in 
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supplier and transaction-specific investments (see section 2.2.1). In addition he discussed 
distributor product-market familiarity and environmental uncertainty. In the following these 
elements and their significance on the Finnish retail market are analysed.  
 
Dependence asymmetry is a major issue on the Finnish retail sector. The market is highly 
concentrated and buyer power is evident. This translates into dependence asymmetry to the 
favour of the retailer, which is evident also in information exchange. Previously ScanTrack 
data was available through a third party to all companies that had the interest and resources to 
purchase it. At the moment suppliers are heavily dependent on the retailers in their access to 
market information. They do have other public and private sources; however cash register data 
measuring historical sales is very important. In comparison to other countries this is clearly a 
lack on the market. It is acknowledged by both suppliers and retailers that the dependence 
favours the downstream firms. In practice, this means that the suppliers are or would be very 
crippled without the information from the retailers (Coughlan et al. 2006) as without the 
information they would have very little leverage in negotiations with the trade. Sales 
information brings them a foundation on which to base their propositions and argumentation on 
issues such as new product launches. In general, this type of reliability could be argued to have 
a negative impact on the market dynamics.  
 
The valuing and perception of importance of the relationship is measured in the 
interdependence magnitude. As discussed earlier in this paper, earlier research does not support 
the claim that information exchange would be higher when both companies perceive the 
relationship essential to their goal achievement (Frazier et al. 2009, see also Sezen & Yilmaz 
2007). In light of this research, these earlier findings are surprising. In the Finnish 
environment, the retailer goals and their linkage to the suppliers seems to have an impact on 
the information sharing and receiving. For SOK it is critical that the suppliers manage their 
production and logistics and hence they share information that promotes this. Kesko, on the 
other hand, views the relationship important in developing their product portfolio and category 
management. Their information sharing and partnerships are thus developed to support these 
goals.  
 
Distributor trust in supplier was initially thought to have little impact in the case of sharing 
external strategic information, such as cash register data. This study shows no contradiction to 
this claim. Likewise, our results are in slight favour of the assertion that trust increases the 
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sharing of internal strategic information. Kesko engages in deeper relationships with 
companies that are valuable to their goal achievement. A common history seems to be one 
aspect in selecting these partner companies as often the benefit from a long relationship is 
mutual trust. Nevertheless, SOK annually discusses their vision for the future and product 
segment budgets with their entire supplier field. This does not seem to be influenced by the 
depth of the relationships or trust between the actors.  
 
This study does not go in depth into the impact of transaction-specific investments that refer to 
the investments made by the supplier or the retailer to support the sales of the supplier‟s 
products by the distributor organisation. It is however interesting to go down a slight side path 
regarding investments: When retailers share information with suppliers, they assume that the 
suppliers have the resources and capacity to analyse the data. Both companies showed interest 
in developing relationships where the supplier data analysis plays a stronger role. The retailers, 
especially Kesko as it seems, are willing to repatriate information that has been analysed by 
suppliers. What is the impact on the investment side? Since ScanTrack has ended, the suppliers 
have had to increase their resources in data processing and analysis. According to supplier 
feedback, this type of resource and system availability is often crucial for deeper partnership or 
cooperation with the retailer. This type of a prerequisite or assumption is also subtly supported 
by retailer comments. As a criterion for partnership, investments may be understandable; 
however as a necessity for receiving information they might strike as demanding.  
 
What is then the role of external and internal strategic information in the exchange between the 
retailers and supplier? It is interesting to analyse their role in the exchange and what may be 
the influencers for possible variations. It is natural that companies do not share internal 
strategic information as lightly as they do external strategic information. This applies to both 
retailers and suppliers. Internal strategic information is largely the future plans of the company 
and their other internal decisions or actions. The research of Frazier (2009) focuses largely on 
distributor sharing of internal strategic information. However, also supplier information is of 
relevance to the retailers. Some retailer comments indicate that supplier internal and external 
strategic information may be hard to attain. SOK indicates that they would be interested in 
getting more in-depth feedback on suppliers‟ future plans and transparency regarding the flow 
of goods and its optimisation. The focus is moving more and more from historical data to 
future forecasting as this also benefits production planning. This will require an increasing 
amount of internal strategic information from retailers and suppliers. 
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4.3.4 Market Power and Orientation 
It has been pointed out that regulatory intervention was not a direct cause for the entire 
ScanTrack exchange to be terminated. FCA‟s Diary 154/61/2007 does not ban the exchange of 
ScanTrack -based market information from the retailers to the suppliers. Theoretically the 
system could have stayed operational upstream although the exchange between the grocery 
traders would have ended. This would have meant that the traders would not have received 
compiled market information. They would have needed to continue to submit cash register data 
to ACNielsen or another third party and then not be further involved with the system. 
Information exchange that the FCA analyzed occurred when the retail traders received back 
aggregated information from ACNielsen.  
 
Yet Kesko and SOK both withdrew themselves from the system and stopped submitting data to 
AC Nielsen already before FCA‟s decision took place. This naturally meant that AC Nielsen 
was not able to keep the system running and offer its services to the field of suppliers either 
and the service collapsed as a whole. It could be argued that in markets of equal power settings, 
such action could not be carried out so easily (Carstensen 2008). The analysis carried out by 
the Finnish Competition Authorities lasted about 1,5 years. Towards the end of it the outcome 
started to crystallize. Especially Kesko was very proactive in stopping their provision of data to 
AC Nielsen already in early 2007. According to a Kesko representative, there were signs of the 
final FCA decision already before it came out and therefore they did not want to carry on with 
the system. All in all, this type of conduct shows that the retailers have a strong power 
advantage as they are able to withdraw from the system without extensive evaluation of how it 
could be developed (Scherer & Ross 1990).  
 
The allocation of market power in the Finnish retail environment has been illustrated by several 
aspects already so far. These include the possibility for retailers to pursue their own strategy 
regardless of supplier interests and strategies. Retailers own the cash register information on 
the market, which gives them tremendous leverage – especially due to the concentrated nature 
of the retail sector. Furthermore, the market share statistics clearly indicate to supplier power 
(Carstensen 2008, Dobson, 2005).  
 
A shocking proposition is that the current courses of action are prone to increase the buyer 
power from where it already is. However, Macneil (1981) points out that the more relational 
interaction becomes, the less buyer power is exercised. Due to the information exchange 
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focusing on the dyad relationships, this is in fact the direction the market is going. Moreover, 
strong buyer power has typically caught interest of antitrust regulators (Perloff et al. 2007), 
which may reduce its impact. 
 
The interests and motivations of retailers play a key role in what eventually happens in the 
dyad relationships. Suppliers may be interest in meeting consumer needs, however retailers 
might act as a bottle neck in between if they do not allow this type of market orientation of 
suppliers (Sigauw et al 1998). In the current situation supplier are fairly heavily reliant on the 
information provided to them by the retailer. They do, however, also have other sources for 
information on the market such as consumer studies or trend reports. Previously ECR Finland 
has been an active party in building the link of the entire value chain to the consumer. A vast 
majority of retailers belong to the association and participation has historically been very 
active, as elaborated by Jukka Jokiranta from ECR. Nonetheless, recently interest has fallen. 
This is not in direct relation to the termination of ScanTrack but instead an overall market 
direction.  
 
4.4 FRAMEWORK REFINED  
This section sums up the empirical findings and mirrors them to the theoretical analysis 
presented earlier in the study. First, the discussion carried out in the empirical part of the study 
is brought together in table 4, which sums up the key challenges of the stakeholders. Thereafter 
the industry environment and relations are presented in the refined framework in figure 9. 
Finally, the significance of each environment and relationship factor on information exchange 
in the Finnish retail market is analysed in table 5.    
 
To begin with, table 4 below identifies the main challenges that the stakeholders of the study 
are currently facing in their information exchange – both in terms of the environment and the 
relationships. In general, most organizations are struggling to build a total market view that is 
detailed enough for their purposes. However, the challenges of the suppliers are stronger when 
compared to the retailers. This notion has been supported by both retailers and suppliers. The 
trade associations have not been affected in their core businesses in such a drastic manner as 
the members of the channel dyad. The main concern for trade associations is to provide their 
member companies with relevant statistics on the market‟s development as well as on the sales 
to the consumers or the retail traders. 
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Table 4. Information Exchange Challenges of Stakeholders 
 
 
 
Moving on, the framework in figure 9 has been refined from the initial framework in section 
2.3. In principal, the findings were in support of the earlier model. However, one notable 
difference regarding the industry actors is the trade associations, which were missing from the 
earlier model. These have been added to the framework below and the interactions they have 
with the channel dyad and other network members are visualised.  
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Figure 9. Refined Conceptual Model of Information Exchange in Finnish Context 
 
 
 
 
The environment and relationship factors influencing information exchange were presented in 
the initial framework. In this section they have been placed in a separate table (table 5) and the 
empirical findings regarding each one are discussed. The table identifies the impact of the 
factors from two different perspectives: first, their bearing on the termination of the ScanTrack 
system, and second, their influence on the information exchange in the current market 
situation.  
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Table 5. Significance of the Factors Influencing Information Exchange in Finnish Context 
 
 
 
One of the most notable issues is that the termination of ScanTrack was not based on broader 
market interaction. Ultimately it was in the hands of the owners of the data being shared. A few 
issues arise when comparing the significance of various factors during the termination of 
ScanTrack in comparison to their impact on the current market situation. Firstly, the extent of 
collusion has been significantly reduced as companies in horizontal market positions have less 
information on each other. Most organisations seem to be increasingly cautious regarding the 
information that they are willing to share. Second, the importance of strategic networks has 
increased to some extent. Also earlier companies were in dyad interaction with each other, 
however now there is no neutral third-party service provider from whom to purchase detailed 
sales information and companies are forced to accumulate this solely from their network 
members. In the next chapter the research findings and implications are discussed in more 
detail.  
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5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter goes through the key outcomes of this study. First, the main findings are 
highlighted as a response to the initial research questions. Second, the theoretical and 
managerial relevance of this study is examined and suggestions for further research are laid 
down. Last, the limitations of the paper are discussed and these are followed by the final 
concluding remarks.  
 
5.1 MAIN FINDINGS 
Looking back at the two initial research questions placed for this study, the aim was to analyse 
what the factors are that influence information exchange in retail environments. The first 
question addressed the environmental influencers and the second focused on intra-company 
and relationship-specific factors. In the following, the research results for these two questions 
are discussed.     
 
First, six different environment factors were identified based on academic literature:  
(1) Extent of concentration 
(2) Extent of collusion 
(3) Channel environment 
(4) Strategic networks 
(5) Isomorphism  
(6) Antitrust regulation  
 
The significance of each one was then analyzed based on the interviews conducted within the 
Finnish retail sector. An interpretation of the finding is presented in the refined framework in 
section 4.4. The findings indicate that market concentration is a critical influencer to 
information exchange. High concentration is potentially followed by issues such as tacit 
collusion, which was most likely also present before the termination of ScanTrack system in 
Finland. Again due to the high market concentration, antitrust regulation had an impact on 
information exchange in the Finnish retail market. Although the Finnish Competition 
Authorities did not prohibit all the information exchange that ScanTrack presented, the indirect 
consequence was that the system was terminated. The logic behind such an indirect implication 
is better responded to by the relationship and company internal factors.  
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In general, the environment indirectly influences the information exchange as the 
environmental parameters affect a firm‟s internal factors and the relationship elements. Related 
to the latter mentioned issues, the following eight factors were recognized: 
(1) Internal Strategy 
(2) Dependence asymmetry 
(3) Interdependence 
(4) Trust in supplier 
(5) Transaction-specific investments 
(6) Compound relationships 
(7) Market orientation 
(8) Market power 
 
Out of these factors it is the internal strategy and goals of a company that emerge with the 
greatest significance. Information exchange is drastically influenced by the priorities of a 
retailer whether they are focused on the category development or aiming to optimize the supply 
chain and create cost-efficient sourcing. The priorities of the retailers could be argued to be the 
key influencer to the termination of ScanTrack exchange. Nevertheless, it was the other 
relationship factors, such as dependence asymmetry favouring the retailer that enabled such an 
outcome.  
 
5.2 RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS 
This study contributes to the research of information exchange in several respects. A total of 
six environment and eight relationship-based factors that influence the information exchange 
between channel members were identified. Focus of the study was on the rapport between 
retailer and supplier. First, the study provides new findings to fulfil earlier research gaps. 
Second, some shortages were identified in the original framework by Achrol et al. (1983). The 
following elaborates on these research implications. 
 
For its own part this study has contributed to providing insight for the closure of certain 
research gaps. Frazier (2009) has previously noted that there is a lack of research on 
distributors sharing strategic information to suppliers. As a response, this study has identified a 
total of fourteen environment and relationship factors that affect this exchange. Empirical 
evaluation is based on a highly concentrated market and hence this research gives insight on 
86 
 
the influencer of information exchange in such a market. Nevertheless, the identified factors 
are also applicable to other types of market environments. One aspect that found support 
during this research is the importance of retailer strategy. It can be argued that the significance 
of this is enough to drive retailers to terminate public information exchange in order to better 
control the information that they own. Retailers are then able to execute their internal strategies 
more efficiently in private dyad relationships with the suppliers.  
 
Another research gap that was earlier established by Frazier (2009) is the effect of market 
concentration on the sharing of strategic information. Based on this study, the high market 
concentration has clear consequences on information exchange. First of all, it lays power to the 
hands of the retailers that are owners of cash register-based market information. In most 
countries, the cooperation on the sharing of this data is seamless. However, in a situation when 
retailers are in a strong power position, they are able to withdraw from the system at their own 
accord. All in all, power seems to be tilted to the benefit of retailer in the relations with the 
suppliers, which is visible for instance in what information and to whom the retailers are ready 
to share market information. Second, high market concentration has to potential to distort 
information like was the case in horizontal retailer information sharing on the Finnish market. 
The aggregated nature of the data suffered from market concentration. A similar situation is 
likely to occur also on the supplier side if high concentration exists in a specific product 
category. In such situations, tacit collusion may occur between companies, even if explicit 
coordinated behaviour does not arise.  
 
The study has also elaborated on the findings of earlier marketing channel research. A few 
shortages were identified in a key framework of earlier literature (Achrol et al. 1983; figure 2: 
“Environment of marketing channel dyads”). The authors identify four different environments 
surrounding the dyad: the input, output, regulatory and competitive environments. In direct 
interaction with the dyad are suppliers, customers, regulatory agents and competitors. The 
model fails to encompass several actors that retailers and suppliers also interact with. Arising 
from this study are also the trade associations as well as all other partner companies and third 
party service providers. The model of Achrol et al. (1983) is likely aimed to be a simplification 
and hence it cannot be assumed to include the entire network of a company. Nevertheless, the 
Finnish retail environment shows that especially the trade associations are relevant to the dyad. 
One solution would be to elaborate the initial model so that the “regulatory environment” 
would in fact include all “external influencers”, namely also as trade associations. 
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5.3 MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
This study shows that the Finnish retail sector is in strong transformation with what comes to 
the sharing of market information amongst the stakeholders, especially between the distributors 
and suppliers. This research gives managers an in-depth analysis of the situation and a 
possibility to see reactions outside their imminent sphere of interaction. The relevance of this 
study does not fade although it is a snapshot in time. In fact, since it focuses on the specific 
years of 2007-2009, it is able to give valuable insight on initial reactions as well as on the 
process that it took to proceed to the solutions that followed or that may potentially emerge in 
the future. The findings voice out the factors that influence information exchange on any 
market between a retailer and a supplier. Moreover, the importance of each of these actors on 
the Finnish retail market is discussed. For retailers and suppliers this study is an opportunity to 
increase comprehension of each other‟s views. They can also benefit from the structured 
framework to analyse the influencers of information exchange.  
 
The regulatory situation in Finland differs quite drastically from what it is in other countries, 
even those close by. This study gives managers a clear analysis of the situation from several 
perspectives. First, it can be useful when managers need more information of the Finnish retail 
sector in particular, such as when they are interested in entering the market or strengthening 
their position within. Second, the analysis of the situation can prove to be a useful benchmark 
if a similar situation in information exchange and stakeholder relations occur in another county 
–or another industry. In this sense, practical benefits can also be drawn by competition 
regulators, who require high-level understanding of all industry sectors. Regulators constantly 
monitor the market situation and compare the dynamics of different industries. This paper 
provides them the opportunity to see the discussion of the stakeholders and their reactions to 
the situation. For the Finnish Competition Authority this study provides viewpoints from firms 
that were outside their imminent research scope on the matter. Moreover, the study sheds light 
on the effects of the regulation on the market as several unintended consequences have 
emerged for which the regulation has not been the direct inflictor.  
 
5.4 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This study has many interesting directions to which research could be carried forward. Firstly, 
one suggestion for further research would be to analyse the link between information exchange 
and retailer strategy in more detail and to identify the different aspects of firm strategy that 
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may be of relevance. Many of the issues that have been recognized, such as transaction-specific 
investments, are in fact consequences of the retailers‟ or suppliers‟ strategies. This study has 
given some insight on how strategy may influence information exchange. For instance, retailer 
interest in developing their category management seems to have a positive effect on the 
exchange. Despite this effort, the scope is very broad and it would benefit from further analysis 
focused specifically on the impact of strategy. Moreover, there may be other factors besides 
those identified in this study that have important influences. The ones mentioned represent 
prospective paths for extending research in the area. If a supplier perspective is taken an 
interesting issue for further analysis would be category captain arrangements and more broadly 
speaking, the possibly unequal position that smaller suppliers have to gaining information from 
retailers. These research suggestions are applicable to any market, however especially 
interesting would be to analyse the dynamics in an industry, where information exchange is 
highly reliant on the dyad relationship, such as the Finnish retail environment.  
 
Moving on, it would be beneficial to conduct quantitative analysis regarding the key 
influencing factors and the weight each one has. This study has given indication on the impact 
of the different factors, however a lot of work remains to be done in order to define their 
significance. A qualitative approach was necessary for this study; conversely future research 
can benefit from the findings and be able to formulate a quantitative research proposition and 
baseline hypothesis.  
 
Last, it would be interesting to specify whether the impact of each is the same in different 
market conditions or if there are noteworthy differences. This raises the point of conducting a 
comparative research on another market area or a different industry. The Finnish environment 
is very peculiar in its concentration in the retail sector and therefore a similar study in another 
market would give additional insight. The retail industry and especially the fast-moving 
consumer goods are a rapid-paced environment where information is needed on a high 
frequency. The market dynamics and needs of some other industry may slightly differ. 
Therefore broadening the scope of the research to another consumer goods or B-to-B industry 
is tempting.  
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5.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The scope of this research is an industry-wide qualitative study of the Finnish retail sector. It 
was however necessary to limit the organizations and industry representatives involved. In the 
end, the pallet included the Finnish Competition Authorities (two interviews), retailer side 
trade organisation (one interview), supplier side trade organisations (two organisations, 
totalling three interviews), ECR Finland (one interview), suppliers (three organisations, 
totalling five interviews), retailers (two organisations, totalling four interviews). This scope is 
fairly large for the purposes of such a study, yet it may bring some restrictions in generalising 
the results on a broader scale (see also section 3.4 regarding the reliability of the study). The 
five firms (Mars, Unilever, Haribo, Kesko and SOK) had all previously used ScanTrack.  
 
Companies that have not used ScanTrack data at any point were left out of the scope of the 
study. However, these companies are scarce in existence since all major players used the data. 
Some rare examples do exist: The fourth largest retailer Lidl with an approximately 4 percent 
market share is commonly known to have been outside the system –both in terms of providing 
data and purchasing it. According to information received from both retailers and suppliers, 
virtually all suppliers in the branded packed goods industries – especially multinational 
companies – used the system. The companies outside of the usage were mainly agricultural 
entrepreneurs and local regional companies, typically being producers of fresh goods such as 
vegetables or pastries. Due to the scope and purpose of the research these companies were not 
relevant for the study.  
 
Geographically the study focused on the Finnish market and especially those companies that 
had been users of the ScanTrack system. There was no motive to expand the study at the same 
time to other geographical regions since the key drivers of the analysis were market-specific. 
These drivers included local market dynamics and competition regulation. It is likely to take an 
entirely new study to analyse the key influencers of information exchange on a different 
market. Having now established the factors it is however possible to study their different 
impacts in other markets in comparison to the market at hand.  
 
This study was slightly limited in its time scope. The study was carried out during 
approximately a two-year time frame. As all industries are constantly evolving and new ways 
of sharing information emerge, individual companies continuously develop and take on new 
strategic directions that affect the type of information exchange that they are interested in. 
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These transformations are in a two-way impact with the relationships between the companies: 
changes within a company affect their relationships and, in reverse, the relationships of a 
company may urge it into new strategies and tactics. All in all, the evolution is constant and 
thus this study was only able to catch the information exchange patterns at one given moment.   
 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
The decision of the Finnish Competition Authorities to terminate horizontal information 
exchange between the retailers was not meant to have implications beyond these firms. 
Nevertheless, the indirect consequences spurred further into the market. It can be argued that 
the ending of ScanTrack on the Finnish market has affected suppliers the strongest. Although 
initial worst case scenarios and impact speculations have not taken place, the challenges are 
still significant. The retailers are also missing information on the overall market, yet they do 
not acknowledge so drastic shortcomings as the suppliers. The trade associations have not been 
impacted in their daily business in such an extent as the suppliers and retailers; yet their 
possibilities to collect market information and compile statistics have been reduced in a few 
cases. To some extent, their data analysis is also based on other sources and hence the effects 
have been minimal. Nonetheless, the trade associations of especially the suppliers have voiced 
concern on behalf of their member companies.  
 
It is interesting to analyse whether there has potentially been implications for the consumers. 
Initially concerns were raised that limited information may affect for instance product 
developed and meeting consumer needs on the long run. To a large extent major suppliers are 
engaged in deep B-to-B relationships with the retailers and this type of an information flow has 
not fully ceased. Consumer information is also derived from other sources that have not been 
affected by the termination of ScanTrack. Interestingly, the interviewed company 
representatives were fairly unanimous on their view that little negative consequences have 
reached the consumer. This opinion was voiced both from the retailer as well as the supplier 
side. However, having less competitor information in price-setting is likely to increase 
aggressive pricing, which draws down the prices, thus positively affecting the consumers.   
 
Due to the full termination of the system, the FCA is to this date occupied by the consultation 
of organisations. Companies and trade associations are very careful in the new types of 
information exchange that they embark on. Since carrying out the empirical analysis for this 
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study, an information exchange system was brought to the public in February 2010. Having 
been built up by the Finnish Food and Drink Industries´ Federation (ETL), the cooperative 
called Selma aims to give an overall market view to suppliers by measuring their deliveries to 
the trade. Also when creating this system, the ETL was in close interaction with the 
competition regulators. Selma is a clear response to the findings of this study, which have 
indicated that the current organizational needs are towards building a more comprehensive 
picture of the market. It also portrays the development of the industry that has constantly 
evolved since the beginning of this research. Nevertheless, it is not a one-off answer to all the 
dilemmas that have surfaced during this study. 
 
When looking back at the transformation that has occurred on the information exchange in the 
retail sector, the time span of the events is something what grabs attention. In 2006, 
information exchange was carried out through the ScanTrack system and a few years later in 
spring 2008 it was fully terminated. This study has taken place between March 2008 and 
January 2010. During the months and years after the ScanTrack service ended, the changes that 
have occurred have mainly put focus on individual company relationships. Private B-to-B 
interaction between given company dyads has increased its importance as more and more of 
the information exchange is carried out through face-to-face meetings or at least agreed to in 
this type of direct interaction. Less development can be seen on the industry level and very few 
companies or coalitions have emerged as third party service providers. Initial strong 
speculation of new information exchange service providers soon dried off. A crucial draw-back 
for this has been the retail traders‟ disinterest to share their cash register consumer sales data.  
 
In conclusion, the Finnish retail market is slowly moving towards new solutions to replace the 
information shortage that followed the termination of ScanTrack. However, many challenges 
still remain unsolved and the future will show what type of interaction or information sharing 
systems will be created to meet the broad and constant need for market information.  
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6 SUMMARY 
The objective of this study was to analyze the exchange of market information in an 
organizational setting and the factors that influence it. The topic was approached from two 
different angles:  
(1) How does industry structure and environment affect information exchange? 
(2) How do company internal factors and relationship traits affect the nature and content of 
information exchange? 
 
The theoretical part of the study analyses industry and channel environments as well as market 
concentration and external regulation to identify influencing factors to information exchange. 
Similarly, the relationship and company internal factors are elaborated through the analysis of 
the dimensions of commitment, compound interaction, market orientation and the internal 
company strategy. As a result, a theoretical framework is presented in section 2.3 to illustrate 
the environment and relationship factors affecting information exchange.  
 
Empirically the study is positioned in the Finnish retail sector. This specific market has faced 
drastic changes in the past years due to the termination of the ScanTrack –based information 
exchange system. ScanTrack was a service operated by the international company AC Nielsen, 
who collected bar code data from retailers and processed it for further distribution. The 
company runs a similar system on numerous other countries. However in Finland, the high 
market concentration of the retailers brought challenges in the usage from the perspective of 
antitrust regulation. As an indirect result of actions of the Finnish Competition Authority, the 
entire system was terminated. 
 
The findings of this study indicate that the internal strategy of a company drastically affects the 
motivation of the company to engage in different kinds of information exchange. In a highly 
concentrated market, where the relationship dynamics are polarized for the favor of the retailer, 
it is very likely that the retailers are able to make significant decisions on information exchange 
solutions and processes.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1. Detailed Interview Listing 
 
Appendix 2. Framework of Interviews 
 
The interviews all had a chronological structure moving from past occurrences to the present 
situation and thereafter future prospects. Non-leading questions were used and probing when 
necessary. Examples of interview questions and overall formulation of the questions has been 
discussed in section 3.2.  
 
All the interviews started with the following elements (see for comparison the guidelines of 
Maykut & Morehouse, 1994, 94):  
1. Personal introduction with focus on interviewer‟s study and work background 
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2. Statement of purpose (incl. contribution to the KAULIN research initiative) 
3. Background and scope of the research and participating companies 
4. Description of the interview structure and agenda; double-checking of the time 
available from the interviewer‟s side  
5. Request of permission to record the interview (granted by all interviewees) 
 
Likewise, all interviews ended with the following elements (if they had not been brought up 
earlier by the interviewee): 
1. Request for permission to mention the company and person by name (this was granted 
by all organizations and interviewees) 
2. Additional information on the study: Schedule, language of writing (English), structure 
of the paper as it focuses on themes rather than individual organizations 
3. Mentioning the possibility to receive a copy of the thesis once it is finalized (all parties 
were interested in this) 
4. Permission to contact the interviewees if further questions or issues arise 
 
 
 
 
